Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada by Mykitiuk, Roxanne & Wallrap, Albert
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1999 
Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada 
Roxanne Mykitiuk 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, rmykitiuk@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Albert Wallrap 
Source Publication: 
Canadian Health Law and Policy. Toronto, ON: Butterworths, 1999, pp. 303-352 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mykitiuk, Roxanne, and Albert Wallrap. "Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada." Downie, 
Jocelyn, and Timothy Caulfield, eds. Toronto, ON: Butterworths, 1999. ISBN: 0433409932. 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of 




iitii IS[Si I[I)I 
This chapter will identify and examine some of the major legal issues raised by 
the development and proliferation of technologies involved in assisted repro-
duction. It will review the application of existing legal principles, statutes and 
common law rules to these issues, and will illustrate the uncertainty present in 
the current legal regime in Canada. The chapter will then evaluate the need for a 
unified regulatory framework for reproductive technologies ("RTs").' While the 
focus of the chapter is an identification and review of the legal issues, it should 
be understood that these are shaped in a moral, ethical and social context. 
As noted by the Law Reform Commission of Canada ("LRC"), "[m]edically 
assisted procreation is perhaps one of the best examples of the challenges posed 
by the development of medical science and the tensions to which they give rise 
for the law."' Distinct from many other forms of medical intervention or prac-
tice, the use of reproductive technologies by some citizens can fundamentally 
Reproductive technologies [hereafter "RTs"] are often defined as "the full range of biomedi-
cal/technical interferences during the process of procreation whether aimed at producing a child 
or preventing/terminating pregnancy" (R.D. Klein, "What's 'new' about the 'new' reproductive 
technologies?" in G. Corea et al., Man-made Women: How New Reproductive Technologies 
Affect Women (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987) at 64). This definition includes abor-
tion, contraception, sterilization, pre-conception and pre-natal testing and birth practices and 
techniques. For purposes of this chapter, RTs will have a narrower meaning and will only in-
clude those techniques and procedures that are used to produce a child. Moreover, while much 
of the literature and many of the commissions which have studied these techniques and prac-
tices refer to them as "new" RTs, this chapter will refer to RTs or forms of assisted conception, 
as a way of acknowledging that one of the practices, assisted insemination, is indeed an old 
practice. 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper 65) 
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) at 1. 
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affect the lives of all Canadians and their children.' Actions taken behind the 
traditionally closed door of the doctor-patient relationship involve broader con-
sequences for all members of society! Because the application of reproductive 
technologies is often carried out within the context of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, many conventional health law issues will arise. Among these are ques-
tions of informed consent, standards of care, confidentiality and the legal regu-
lation of the practioners performing various techniques of medically assisted 
conception. In these cases, traditional sources of health law— including many 
of the common law standards and principles and statutory provisions discussed 
in this book - should provide adequate means for regulating practice and re-
solving disputes in this area. However, because reproductive technologies hold 
the potential to transform social relationships, their introduction into medical 
practice involves issues beyond the physician-patient relationship and the exist-
ing regulation of medical practice. 
RTs enable the deliberate manipulation of the processes and materials of hu-
man reproduction outside of sexual intercourse. Usually, the intention and effect 
is to produce a child. However, current innovations in reproductive biology and 
medicine also produce or isolate other reproductive materials or entities: vials of 
semen, unfertilized ova, zygotes, embryos' which have not existed in this 
way before. How are we to regard and treat these novel entities? Who has con-
trol over them? For what can they be used? The use of RTs, moreover, makes 
possible the creation of novel social arrangements: post-mortem insemination ,6 
The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies [hereinafter "Royal Commission"] 
reported that in 1991 between approximately one and two per cent of all births in Canada were 
the result of either artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization; Royal Commission, Proceed 
With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992) at 435. 
This point is made by M. Hudson in "Societal Controls on New Reproductive Technologies: A 
Canadian Perspective" in L. Weir, ed., Governing Medically Assisted Human Reproduction: 
Report of an International Symposium (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 
1997) 73 at 73. 
As noted by the Royal Commission, there is a problem with the terminology in this area. 
Technically, the term "zygote" refers to the fertilized egg prior to implantation. "Embryo" re-
fers to the developing entity after implantation into a woman's uterus until about eight weeks 
after fertilization, when it becomes known as a fetus. However, since the term embryo is often 
used in public discourse in place of zygote, we continue to use it in reference to the fertilized 
egg prior to implantation. For further discussion of this issue see: Royal Commission, supra, 
note 3 at 607. See also Bill C- 47 Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act, 2nd 
Sess., 35th Parl., 1996 s. 2. Bill C-47 draws a distinction between zygotes (or pie-embryos) and 
embryos, where the former means a human organism in its first 15 days of development, and 
the latter refers to one beginning from the 16th day to the 56th day. This distinction seems 
rather arbitrary and based on such factors as the state of medical knowledge and the embryos' 
development of specific human-like features, such as the early indicators of a nervous system. 
The fetus is defined by its development beginning from the 57th day to birth. 
See Parpalaix v. CECOS T.G.I. Creteil, August 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais, September 15, 1984 
(France). See infra, note 193. (dispositional control over the deceased's sperm deposit); Hecht 
v. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (Kane), 20 Cal.Rptr. 
2d 275 (1993) (deceased's sperm as part of his estate distributed in light of his intentions to 
virgin births, post-menopausal pregnancy,' multiple "parents," anonymous ge-
netic parents, and embryos conceived at one time being born at different times, 
or to different people. How are we to understand these new social arrangements 
and how should they be regulated? These and other questions focus on the ways 
in which RTs are defined and conceptualized in theory, as well as accessed and 
controlled in practice. The use of RTs holds implications for kinship and thereby 
alters our understanding of the legal, social, and emotional bonds created by 
heredity and the consequences presumed to ensue from processes of intercourse, 
conception and birth. 
Typically, health law investigates the principles, statutes, and constitututional 
and policy framework, which shape the allocation and delivery of health care 
services and the relationship between the health care provider and patient. The 
World Health Organization ("WHO") defines health as a state of physical and 
mental well-being - a definition broader than that of medicine. Health is more 
than the absence of disease and includes the harmonious development of the 
human person! Moreover, since human beings socially interact, whether in the 
medical sciences or the daily routines of life, health is as much a social con-
struction as a biological condition; its norms are constructed in a social envi-
ronment and include not only medical-scientific determinants but also social 
determinants. Law can be one such determinant. Since law helps to determine 
and regulate the social relations which underpin individual well-being and, by 
implication, individual health status, law itself becomes one of the factors which 
affect individual health. 
In the area of RTs, where the very novelty of the procedures and their impact 
suggests the lack of social consensus about the right or proper course of action, 
the focus turns to the recurring question: what should the law be? The emer-
gence of RTs over the last quarter century has sparked numerous efforts at 
regulatory reform by panels and commissions established in many jurisdictions 
throughout the world. These assembled groups considered whether or not to 
establish a new reproductive order, or to find ways of containing the new pos-
sibilities engendered by the RTs within the old reproductive order.' 
While these forums have led to volumes of recommendations and sometimes, 
regulations, they have rarely led to legislation." One possible response would be 
to distinguish between regulating reproductive technologies and establishing 
legal norms for their consequences. It has been argued that regulation should 
procreate after death); R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, 
[1997] 2 All E.R. 687 (C.A.) (use of sperm taken from comatose husband without prior written 
consent as required by legislation). 
See A. Lippman, "Never Too Late': Biotechnology, Women and Reproduction" (1995) 40 
McGill L.J. 875. 
8 B.M. Knoppers & S. Le Bris, "Ethical and legal concerns: reproductive technologies 1990-
1993" (1993)5 Cur-rent Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynaecology 630 at 631. 
D. Roy, J. Williams & B. Dickens, Bioethics in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall 
Canada Inc., 1994) at 132. 
Knoppers et al., supra, note 8 at 630. 
- - 
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focus solely on the particular ends ethically unacceptable in society," rather than 
widely constrain and "chill" medical science and technology. Alternatively, a 
regulatory regime might account for the use of RTs as both a means by assisting 
biological processes and as ends with social implications. This chapter will ex-
plore the legal ramifications of pursuing either approach to the regulation of 
RTs. Currently, there is a legal vacuum regarding the express regulation of re-
productive technologies in Canada. Although statutes and case law in America 
and other jurisdictions provide some guidance, their application as persuasive 
forces in the Canadian context remains questionable. 
In Canada, the dominant tendency has been to regulate reproductive tech-
nologies as medical practice, rather than to address alternatives such as adoption 
and the social acceptance of infertility. The increasing use of RTs have height-
ened calls for legal regulation by interested citizens and practitioners who now 
seek clear guidance from statutory or judge-made law. In recent years there have 
been several proposals for legal reform put forward by a number of formal 
commissions, most significantly, the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies ("Royal Commission"). These efforts at the time of writing, how-
ever, have yet to result in any comprehensive legislation. The Bill near the end 
of the enactment process, however, died on the order paper when Parliament 
was dissolved on April 27, 1997, just prior to a federal election. Although Bill 
C-47 never came into force, and thus has no legal effect, it illustrates how the 
federal government has recently approached regulatory concerns for RTs. In this 
chapter, we occasionally draw upon Bill C-47 to not only describe past regula-
tory attempts, but also to illustrate possible forms of future legislation that gov-
ernments may consider in their renewed efforts at regulation. 
This chapter canvasses the basic definitions of infertility taking into account 
both the biological factors and social norms which colour the stipulation of in-
fertility as a medical condition. We then describe the RTs used in the treatment 
of infertility and raise a number of legal issues arising from the introduction of 
RTs in medical practice. These issues include: access to RTs, informed consent 
and the legal rules governing the status, control and disposition of sperm, ova 
and embryos. This chapter explores the constitutional, common law and statu-
tory implications of such issues. We consider a range of possible legal and 
regulatory frameworks governing the use of RTs. The chapter ends with a de-
tailed review of specific legal problems generated by the advent of RTs. 
A. INFERTILITY 
Reproductive technologies are considered as a treatment for the condition of 
infertility experienced by women and men. Infertility may be viewed as a medi-
cal problem with biological and physiological aspects, or as a social condition of 
childlessness. However, one's view of whether childlessness should be as good 
and acceptable a choice as having children can shape the distinction between 
medical problem and social condition. The Royal Commission states that 
B. Dickens, "Do Not Criminalize New Reproductive Technologies" (March 1996) Policy Op-
tionsil. 
"[d]efining infertility as a socially generated problem implies that we should 
look to social solutions  .1112  Moreover, for both medical and social conditions (or 
problems), the communication of what it means to be infertile involves particu-
lar language and definitions chosen by medical practitioners, legislators, and 
other interested parties. Recourse to reproductive technologies as a response to 
infertility, however, has traditionally been based on the diagnosis of infertility as 
a medical problem or disease to be treated according to medical procedures. In 
the medical model, physicians and other health care practitioners identify and 
evaluate the condition of infertility, and then make choices about the appropriate 
use of RTs and their regulation. Many critics and commentators question the 
claims of the medical community to define or diagnose infertility as a medical 
problem and then to prescribe RTs as the best possible treatment to achieve re-
production. Closer examination of the causes and incidences that identify the 
condition of infertility raise questions about the appropriateness of the medical 
model as a framework within which to define the treatment of infertility. We 
will now consider alternative definitions and illustrate the ways in which the 
condition and definition of infertility shape the legal regulation of RTs.'3 
According to most medical definitions, infertility is the inability to produce a 
child despite regular unprotected intercourse over a certain period of time dur-
ing a woman's fertile period. According to Bernard Dickens, in an oft-quoted 
passage: 
Infertility includes infecundity, meaning inability to conceive or impregnate, and 
pregnancy wastage, meaning failure to carry a pregnancy to term through sponta-
neous abortion and stillbirth. Infertility includes primary infertility, where a cou-
ple has never achieved conception, and secondary fertility, where at least one con-
ception has occurred but the couple is currently unable to achieve pregnancy.'4 
In Canada, infertility is typically defined as failure to conceive within one year 
of regular unprotected sexual intercourse." The WHO, however, stipulates a 
time period of two years.'6  At least some medical practitioners treat infertility 
Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 173. The common assumption is that the need and desire 
to have children is a normal part of our lives. 
See Royal Commission, ibid., at 172-75. See also S. Franklin, "Deconstructing 'Desperateness': 
The Social Construction of Infertility in Popular Representations on New Reproductive Tech-
nologies," in M. McNeil, I. Varcoe & S. Yearley, The New Reproductive Technologies (New 
York: St. Martins Press, 1990) at 200. See also T. Balakrishnan & R. Fernando, "Infertility 
Among Canadians: An Analysis of Data from the Canadian Fertility Survey (1984) and General 
Social Survey (1990)," in Royal Commission, The Prevalence of Infertility in Canada, vol. 6 
(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, Canada, 1993). Infertility has also been categorized 
as perceived or inferred infertility, where the former refers to the woman's "subjective" percep-
tion of infertility, and the latter to an "objective" inference of infertility according to basic cri-
teria; ibid., "Aggregate infertility" is said to be a combination of perceived and inferred infer-
tility; ibid. 
B. Dickens, "Reproduction Law and Medical Consent" (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 255 at 281. 
Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 183. 
Ibid. 
308 Canadian Health Law and Policy 
negatively as a "malfunctioning" of the human system over a period of time, 
and thus as a "disease."" In Canada, three formal commissions have enunciated 
three different definitions of "infertility" which span the spectrum of the medi-
cal and the social. The Ontario Law Reform Commission ("OLRC") defined 
infertility in terms of couples who "have attempted, but failed, to produce a 
child and do not respond to conventional therapy."8 The OLRC's definition is 
limited to medical criteria, and does not include "personal choices that bear no 
relation to the issue of medical need."9 Similarly, the LRC defined infertility as 
"the involuntary, significant reduction of reproductive capacity," as based on the 
"inability to become pregnant after one year of unprotected intercourse."20 On 
the other hand, the Royal Commission simply defined the "prevalence of infer-
tility" over one (and two years): "The absence of pregnancy in a couple who 
have been cohabiting for at least the past year and who have not used contra-
ception during that period."2' The Royal Commission elaborated an account 
addressing "the physiological and sociological aspects of infertility."22 The three 
definitions of infertility above illustrate the conflation of social and medical 
factors. The recommendations by each formal commission, and thus possible 
regulatory regimes, seem to vary according to these definitions and the social 
context of their production. 
Infertility has also been variously identified as a social condition. The tradi-
tional view emphasizes the dominant model of the nuclear family, consisting of 
heterosexual parents and their biologically-related children. Under this model, 
infertility derogates from the "ideal family" as the norm of a married heterosex-
ual couple with children. This model generates strong social pressure to satisfy 
the norm for couples to procreate. The basic assumption is that the need and 
desire to have children is a normal part of our lives.23 Moreover, the stigma of 
childlessness can be overwhelming, especially for women who have historically 
' Ibid., at 172. 
18 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related 
Matters, vol. 1 (Toronto: Ministry of Attorney General, 1985) at 9. Conventional therapy for 
males and females varies and may include infertility counselling, hormones, and surgery; ibid., 
at 14-15. 
19  Ibid., at 10. 
20 Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra, note 2 at 14. 
21 Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 186. The Royal Commission also used a two-year defini-
tion, substituting into the quoted version, "for at least the past two years." The Royal Commis-
sion, however, failed to address the definition and issue of contraception, nor did it account for 
lesbian and single women not cohabiting with a male partner. 
22  Ibid., at 173. The Royal Commission assumes that physiological dimensions can be, at times, 
entirely separated from sociological dimensions. 
23 It has been argued that the "need" and "desire" for children conflate social and biological ex-
planations of infertility; S. Franklin, "Deconstructing 'Desperateness': The Social Construction 
of Infertility in Popular Representations on New Reproductive Technologies," supra, note 13. 
See also K. Alpem, "Genetic Puzzles and Stork Stories: On the Meaning and Significance of 
Having Children," in K. Alpem, ed., The Ethics of Reproductive Technology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) at 147. 
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been defined and identified through their roles as mothers.24 The "treatment" of 
women for the condition or "disease" of infertility must therefore be viewed in 
this gender-specific context. In response to involuntary childlessness, RTs 
promise enablement or, at least, give hope for procreation. However, RTs may 
also generate new stresses and problems where "infertile" women may feel pres-
sured to use RTs, and to continue to do so, cycle after cycle even when treat-
ment repeatedly fails. This pressure can have significant economic, physiologi-
cal and psychological costs. Conversely, women who choose to pay to repro- 
duce (in "surrogacy" contracts) may be stigmatized as "deviant" or criminal 
under some proposed legislative models - in spite of the considerable social 
pressure to produce children. The commercialization of procreation is viewed as 
problematic in light of societal norms; the basic assumption is that human re-
production is usually outside the market realm. 
Persons who do not have partners of the opposite sex are not generally rec-
ognized as being "infertile" when procreation outside of marriage is not socially 
desirable. In addition, single women who procreate without the involvement of a 
male partner, lesbian couples, or women who wish to have a child without be-
coming pregnant may be considered as socially infertile, and may seek access to 
various forms of assisted reproduction. Some individuals and couples who carry 
genetic conditions may wish to avoid natural procreation and passing these 
conditions onto their child. Those persons not considered medically "infertile" 
in light of definitions in formal guidelines or informal practices may therefore 
use reproductive technologies. 
Infertility is said to be caused by, or at least associated with, several factors 
of medical (or biological), environmental and social dimensions. The more 
common physiological causes have been recognized as sexually transmitted 
diseases, smoking, and age.25 Where people wait longer before attempting to 
reproduce, they face lower chances of success due to biological aging and the 
increased exposure to risk factors over time." Infertile individuals may, also, 
wait longer than those who are fertile, before seeing a physician. Other possible 
causes of biological infertility include environmental toxins and workplace haz-
ards, diet, alcohol, caffeine, illicit drugs, medical disease, medical procedures 
with unintended effects, sterilization, and contraception.27 Having identified 
some possible causes, one also faces the possibility of confusing them with the 
effects of infertility. For example, it could also be argued that old age is not only 
a cause of infertility but also an effect of one's natural progression to a state of 
24 See N. Pfeffer, "Artificial Insemination, In Vitro Fertilization, and the Stigma of Infertility" in 
M. Stanworth, ed. Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1987) at 81. 
25 Royal Commission, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Repro-
ductive Technologies (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1992), at 172. 
26  Ibid., at 190-91, 255, 261-62; Ontario Law Reform Commission, vol. 1, supra, note 18 at 12-
13. It is well known that the old age factor affects the fertility of females much more so than 
males. 
2/ Royal Commission, supra, note 25 at 199-338. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medi-
cally Assisted Procreation (Working Paper 65) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 
1992), at 15-17. See also Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 18 at 10-14. 
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not being capable to reproduce. Thus, RTs leading to post-menopausal preg-
nancy may be said to address both the causes and effects of infertility. 
Infertility is often regarded as affecting couples, thus reinforcing the idea that 
treatments be only available to socially recognized unions. This obscures the 
fact that single individuals may be concerned about their reproductive health 
status and may seek treatment even before wishing to reproduce. Moreover, 
individuals may not be aware of their medical or biological infertility. Where 
infertility is reported as a percentage of the adult population of childbearing age, 
teens and post-menopausal women (who have now gained access to RTs in 
some countries)" who are infertile will be excluded. These and numerous other 
considerations illustrate how social values and policy preferences have circum-
scribed the biological definitions of infertility and may not be included in re-
ported figures based on actual treatment. The medically infertile couple, for 
example, has maintained dominance as a privileged form of social relationship. 
The use of "couples" as a standard for recognizing infertility does not ac-
count for men's "child-bearing" age. Most reproductive technologies have fo-
cused on women as the problematic part of the couple. They can be the subjects 
of treatment even when the male partner is medically (or biologically) infertile. 
Sometimes, fertile women undergo invasive procedures, such as in vitro fertili-
zation, for the treatment of their infertile husbands. This tendency occurs in the 
face of empirical evidence indicating that the incidence of infertility among men 
ranges from approximately half to equal that of women.29 However, men's in-
fertility is much less researched and understood than women's." This is an ex-
ample of the social and gendered aspect of infertility. Although infertility is 
generally thought to be on the rise, this may, in part, stem from the large number 
of women who delay having children to establish their careers. It is therefore 
appropriate to consider the condition of infertility as an inextricable complex of 
social and medical (or biological) dimensions. 
The infertile are said to have several options: treatment by RTs; adoption; or 
"live with it." A more comprehensive and comprehensible approach would ac-
count for these options in social context, particularly the prevailing perceptions 
For example, see "Baby Sparks Dispute," The Globe and Mail (12 January 1995). See also A. 
Lippman, "Never Too Late': Biotechnology, Women and Reproduction" (1995) 40 McGill 
L.J. 875. 
29 
A report conducted for the Royal Cominisssion found that male infertility occurred in one-
quarter of couples who sought treatment at a fertility clinic; supra, note 25 at 167. The Ontario 
Law Reform Commission [hereafter "OLRC"] reports that "[t]here appears to be general 
agreement that the causes of infertility are distributed evenly among male factors, female fac-
tors, and a combination of both male and female factors"(OLRC, supra, note 18 at 11). See also 
another study reported by the OLRC indicating marked differences similar to those found by 
the Royal Conmiission; ibid, at note 6. It should be noted, however, that empirical studies on 
infertility, in light of the social stigmatization attached to its reporting, may be under a shroud 
of mystery. The lack of data, however, seems to benefit the status quo, focusing on women's 
infertility, and not men's contribution. Moreover, such studies may exclude those who deliber-
ately choose, for genetic or other reasons, not to attempt conception. 
30 Royal Conmiission, supra, note 25 at 167. 
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and attitudes towards "family" relations." The alternatives of adoption and the 
"live with it" option have not yet alleviated public concerns. Public adoption 
involves an average six-year wait due to a shortage of babies to be adopted .31 
The process is long and complex, and remains difficult for single women and 
men. Alternatively, the widespread acceptance of the "live with it" option would 
require a notable shift in social norms in Canadian society. Such shifts in Cana-
dian values seem difficult to recognize and therefore to account for within gov-
ernment policy and a regulatory regime. The lack of adoption opportunities and 
the basic social unacceptability of infertility have generated an increasing de-
mand for RTs and their regulation. The various conditions, problem-definitions, 
and options for the treatment of infertility have generated much confusion 
among practitioners and interested parties. 
In response to the prevalence of infertility, the Royal Commission recom-
mends that priority be given to prevention of infertility rather than focusing 
solely on its treatment.33 The federal government's White Paper proposes to ad-
dress the condition of infertility by stressing "infertility prevention, social solu-
tions and, lastly, infertility interventions that are appropriate, safe, and effec-
tive."" Such proposals, if implemented, would require the re-allocation of re-
sources among lines of prevention and treatment within the health care system. 
We will now consider the challenges of RTs and their regulation as a primary 
treatment for infertility, providing new opportunities for reproduction by infer-
tile individuals and couples. 
t• lilulsi bo(si : k[S] full a1 
Several reproductive technologies exist for treatment of infertility, namely, do-
nor or non-donor artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization and related tech-
nologies, and embryo manipulation and research.35 Artificial insemination is the 
oldest and most basic reproductive technique, and may occur by hus-
band/partner ("AIH") or by donor ("AID").` It involves the artificial (or thera-
peutic) placement of sperm into the vagina, cervix, uterus, or fallopian tube at 
the appropriate time. The placement coincides with ovulation so as to increase 
the chances of conception. As a relatively inexpensive and non-invasive proce-
dure, artificial insemination has been a popular first choice for the treatment of 
biological and social infertility. However, another reproductive technique is 
3i The Royal Commission contends that the biological and sociological aspects of reproduction 
are intertwined; ibid., at 169. 
32  Ibid., at 370. See also the OLRC, supra, note 18 at 15-17. 
33 Royal Commission, ibid., at 177. 
" New Reproductive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health (Ottawa: Supply and 
Services Canada, 1996) at 19. 
35  For a more detailed discussion, see Law Reform Commission, supra, note 27 at 22-76; Royal 
Commission, supra, note 25 at 425-659. 
36 It is also called therapeutic insemination by husband/partner ("TIH") or by donor ("TID"). In 
practice, the semen by the husband/partner may be mixed with that of the donor. The Royal 
Commission concludes that this practice is not considered good practice as it generates ambi-
guity over parentage; ibid., at 439. 
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required where infertility is due to the absence or blockage of a woman's fallo-
pian tubes (i.e., when the egg cannot pass through the fallopian tubes to be fertil-
ized and implanted in the uterus). 
In vitro fertilization has rapidly developed since its introduction in the late 
1970s, and has brought with it many new possibilities for assisted reproduc-
tion.37 In vitro fertilization basically involves the retrieval of a woman's eggs 
from her ovaries and the fertilization of those eggs (in a glass petri dish, or in 
vitro) outside her body and their re-implantation either into her womb or that of 
another woman.38 The in vitro process usually involves the creation of many 
embryos and the selection of a few for implantation; the remaining embryos 
may be destroyed, frozen for later use, donated to other women or couples, or 
used for research. In vitro fertilization is much more onerous than artificial in-
semination. The monitoring of ovulation, the inducement of superovulation, and 
the retrieval of a woman's eggs are invasive with attendant medical risks and 
side effects.39 In vitro fertilization is typically used when infertility is due to the 
absence or blockage of a woman's fallopian tubes, or male factor infertility. 
Assisted reproduction may also involve related technologies such as gamete 
intra-fallopian transfer ("GIFT") and intracytoplasmic sperm injection. In treat-
ment of male factor infertility, in vitro fertilization may be combined with the 
micromanipulation techniques of sperm injection and egg manipulation (i.e., 
zona cutting or drilling for easier sperm penetration). Intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection is a relatively new procedure, which involves the careful selection and 
injection of a single sperm into an egg."° GIFT is a procedure which places 
sperm and eggs directly into the fallopian tube.4' It is combined with superovu-
lation, a preliminary process, which produces additional eggs for placement 
back into the fallopian tube to increase the possibility of conception. The fertili-
zation itself is said to occur naturally. The GIFT process, however, does not 
assist women with fallopian tube blockage. 
Embryos may also be genetically screened or even manipulated prior to im-
plantation. For example, it may someday be possible: to manipulate an embryo 
to produce one containing the same genetic information as a living or deceased 
human being; to alter its genetic structure so that such alteration may be trans-
mitted to a subsequent generation; or to create animal-human hybrids.42 Such 
attempted manipulations might also be implanted into a woman and even 
37 C.L. Meyer, The Wandering Uterus: Politics and the Reproductive Rights of Women (New 
York: New York University Press, 1997). 
' For a more detailed description, see Law Reform Commission, supra, note 27 at 22-50. 
39 The side effects of superovulation, for example, can include: hot flushes, abdominal discomfort, 
blurred vision and ovarian cysts. See: D.L. Steinberg, Bodies in Glass: Genetics, Eugenics, 
Embryo Ethics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) at 34-35. 
'° 
It is also claimed that intracytoplasmic sperm injection, when combined with epididymal sperm 
aspiration - making it possible to retrieve sperm from the epididymis or the testicles - creates 
new reproductive opportunities for men with low sperm counts (Toronto Centre for Advanced 
Reproductive Technology, Newsletter, 1996). 
41 See Law Reform Commission, supra, note 27 at 50-53. 
42 See Bill C-47, An Act Respecting Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies and Com-
mercial Transactions Relating to Human Reproduction, 2nd Sess., 35th Part., 1996, s. 4. 
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brought to term. Moreover, in vitro fertilization and genetic screening may 
someday allow for the screening and manipulation of embryos for particular 
genetic traits. Current in vitro procedures already involve a selection process 
where the most viable of many embryos are chosen for implantation. The re-
maining embryos may be frozen, stored, and manipulated for use at a later date. 
As well, these remaining embryos may be used for research purposes, where 
researchers manipulate, through experimentation, various environmental factors 
or the genetic makeup of embryos. 
So far, we have described the RTs commonly used in Canada. These have 
been developed in line with medically accepted definitions of infertility and are 
evolving continually. As illustrated above, however, any effective regulatory 
framework will have to contend with the controversy surrounding the estab-
lishment of a generally agreed upon definition of infertility, and by implication, 
who may be eligible for what forms of medical treatment. In the absence of such 
social consensus, any suggested regulatory framework would need to allow 
flexibility to account for differing outlooks on the definition, prevention and 
treatment of infertility. 
[ xe(sjw..ulei .4 •) I.'i al bD(SJ k[I] .iei I WOMMUM 
The regulation of reproductive technologies in Canada currently involves con-
sideration of various statutes, case law and the Constitution Act, 1982. In this 
section we will consider existing legislation and related case law concerning the 
transfer and storage of human tissues, as well as the constitutional constraints 
imposed by the division of powers and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms ("Charter") together with the related body of common law. In addi-
tion, we will review the proposed legislation put before the order paper of the 
35th Parliament, Bill C-47, Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies 
Act't5  which would have prohibited specific RTs and certain related forms of 
medical practice. 
The legal regulation of RTs may be broadly classified under the categories of 
public or private law. The former involves statutory regulation by governments 
and the latter involves judicial resolution of disputes among private parties at 
common law. Private ordering may be challenged under human rights legisla-
tion, whereas public regulation may, in addition, face review under the Consti-
tution Act. There are those who argue that human reproduction and medical re-
search properly belong to the private sphere and should not be restricted by 
public regulation unless there are exceptionally compelling reasons. These 
voices effectively propose a free market for RTs using liberal arguments in op-
position to government intrusion. This argument equates medical laboratories 
with the bedroom in the home as sites of human reproduction. It is further ar-
gued that government regulation would produce a "chilling" effect on medical 
research and development of RTs. Others, however, reply that private ordering 
43 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter "Constitution Act"]. 
44 Part I of the Constitution Act, ibid. [hereinafter the "Charter"]. 
45  Supra, note 42. 
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merely shelters actual or potential unethical medical research and practice from 
public scrutiny. 
In Canada, there has been no comprehensive legislative response to the legal 
issues raised by reproductive technologies. Moreover, there has been only lim-
ited litigation and therefore there is little case law and common law guidance in 
this area. In the absence of express law, RTs may be implicated in a number of 
ways, for example, under the heads of human tissue legislation, property law, 
contracts, torts, criminal law, the regulation of professions, and constitutional 
law. In the absence of existing legislation and case law directly applicable to 
RTs, these areas of law become important for regulation. 
i1m aeIII as 
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Although the federal and provincial governments have not yet committed them-
selves to a comprehensive response to the Royal Commission's recommenda-
tions, some relevant legislation has been introduced. Under regulations of the 
Food and Drugs Act,47 which became enforceable June 1, 1996, the federal gov-
ernment controls the processing, testing and distribution of semen for donor 
insemination." These regulations now require that semen be quarantined for at 
least six months to test for HIV and various diseases and genetic conditions." 
The Excise Tax Act" also regulates the importation of human sperm.51 In addi- 
46 For discussion on RTs in other jurisdictions see, E. Bernat, "Towards a New Legal Regulation 
of Medically Assisted Reproduction: The Austrian Approach" (1992) 11 Medicine and Law 
547; B. Knoppers & E. Sloss, "Recent Developments: Legislative Reforms in Reproductive 
Technology" (1986) 18 Ottawa L. Rev. 663; Royal Commission, Proceed with Care: Final Re-
port of The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply 
and Services Canada, 1992); Law Reform Commission, supra, note 27; L. Jonsson, 
"Regulation of Reproductive Technologies in Sweden" in L. Weir, ed., Governing Medically 
Assisted Human Reproduction: Report of an International Symposium (Toronto: Centre of 
Criminology, University of Toronto, 1997) at 87; L. Wailer, "Australian Legislation on Infer-
tility Treatments" in L. Weir, ed., ibid., at 91; J. Woodside, "The Role and Function of the Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology Authority: Legislation, Regulation and Consultation" in L. 
Weir, ed., ibid., at 97. 
'° Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. 
48 Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, SOR/96-254 under 
the Food and Drugs Act, ibid. The regulations also follow the Guidelines for Therapeutic Do-
nor Insemination 1992/3, "as amended from time-to-time," and published by the Canadian 
Fertility and Andrology Society. Sections 5 to 8 allow for the importation of tested semen, if 
additional processing criteria are met, including written notice to the Director. In addition, the 
regulations require specific procedures be undertaken pertaining to screening, laboratory con-
trols, labelling, records and tracing of semen; ss. 9-18. 
49 Ibid., s. 4. (l)(b). 
50 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15. 
51 Various acts to amend the Excise Tax Act, ibid., have described human sperm using the lan-
guage of property: Goods and Services Tax Act, S.C. 1990, c. 45, s. 180(1) and Excise Tax Act,  
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tion, Quebec, Newfoundland, and the Yukon, under family law, have regulated 
the use of donor sperm.72  These provinces have legislated the presumption that 
the male partner of a woman inseminated with donor sperm is deemed the father 
of the child if he consented to the donor insemination. Quebec is the only prov-
ince to have regulated the use of donor eggs. The gestational mother in Quebec 
is deemed to be the mother for legal purposes.53 
Several provinces have also introduced legislation regulating the exchange of 
human tissues, ostensibly for the purpose of controlling organ transplantation. 
The legislation in most provinces involves the same definition for human tissue: 
"includes an organ, but does not include any skin, bone, blood, blood constitu-
ent or other tissue that is replaceable by natural processes of repair."  54 Canadian 
courts, however, have not yet had the opportunity to consider the application of 
this provincial legislation to the donation of gametes and embryos. It thus re-
mains questionable whether courts will interpret gametes (sperm and ova) as 
"human tissue." One might argue that gametes are genetically unique and 
"replaceable by natural processes of repair," like blood. On the other hand, 
while embryos are genetically unique, they are not exactly replaceable. We will 
further discuss human tissue legislation later in this chapter. 
rig ts)JJ ii rn 
In response to growing public concerns, the Government of Canada appointed 
the Royal Commission in October 1989. The mandate empowered the Royal 
Commission to examine: "[the] implications of new reproductive technologies 
for women's reproductive health and well-being," "the causes, treatment and 
prevention of male and female infertility," various reproductive and related 
technologies; "social and legal arrangements, the status and rights of people 
using or contributing to reproductive services," and "the economic ramifications 
of these technologies."" The Royal Commission set forth an "ethic of care" 
framework and a guiding, though inexhaustive, set of eight ethical principles for 
decision-making: "individual autonomy, equality, respect for human life and 
dignity, protection of the vulnerable, non-commercialization of reproduction, 
S.C. 1993, c. 27, s. 180(2) address the importation of human sperm: R.S.C. 1985, E-15, Sch. 
VI, "Zero-Rated Supplies" Part I, s. 5 considers "a supply of human sperm" under the heading 
of prescription drugs and biologicals deemed "zero-rated supplies" for purposes of GST appli-
cation. 
52 See Children's Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 22, s. 13; arts. 538, 539 CCQ. 
53 See art. 53, CCQ.; L.Q. 1991, c. 64. 
54 For example, see Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 20, s. 1; Human Tissue Gift Act, 
R.S.A. 1980, c. H-12, s. 1(b); Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211,s. 1. But see also 
CCQ 1991, c. 64, art. 19, which states that a person may "... alienate a part of his [sic] body 
only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no serious risk to his [sic] health 
results." Article 20 of the CCQ requires that "[t]he alienation must be gratuitous unless its ob-
ject is a part of the body susceptible to regeneration." 
55 The Royal Commission was established under Part I of the Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-li, 
with a mandate by Order in Council Nos. P.C. 1989-2150 (October 1989) and P.C. 1991-524 
(March 1991). 
56 Royal Commission, supra, note 46 at 3. 
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appropriate use of resources, accountability, and balancing of individual and 
collective interests" ;57 in doing so, the Royal Commission promoted "mutual 
care and connectedness" between individuals, families and communities .58 The 
Royal Commission further elaborated, "[t]he ethic of care means that a large 
part of ethical deliberation is concerned with how to build relationships and pre-
vent conflict, rather than being concerned only with resolving conflicts that have 
already occurred." The interests of individuals and communities thus may be 
considered interdependent." 
Under an "ethic of care" framework, the Royal Commission analyzed much 
empirical evidence and formalized its position on the regulation of new repro-
ductive and genetic technologies in Canada. In November 1993, the Royal 
Commission made public 293 recommendations, concluding that "decisive, 
timely, and comprehensive national action is required with respect to the regu-
lation of new reproductive technologies."' In particular, the Royal Commission 
called for legislation to set clear boundaries around acceptable and non-
acceptable uses of new reproductive and genetic technologies and to regulate 
and monitor the use of acceptable practices and developments in this field. To 
achieve this goal, the Royal Commission stated that the federal government 
should use its power under the Criminal Code" to prohibit practices that 
"because of their unsafe or unethical character [are] considered unacceptable 
under any circumstances .1112 In addition, the Royal Commission recommended 
the establishment of a national regulatory commission charged with the respon-
sibility of setting and enforcing standards for those practices deemed acceptable. 
The major functions of this proposed national commission were to be: 
"licensing and monitoring; guideline and standard setting; informatibn collec-
tion, evaluation, and dissemination; records storage; consultation, coordination, 
and intergovernmental cooperation; and monitoring of future technologies and 
practices."" 
In July 1995, the federal Minister of Health, the Honourable Diane Marleau, 
called for an interim moratorium on specific applications of new reproductive 
and genetic technologies, and announced the appointment of an advisory 
committee to monitor compliance with the moratorium.' In June 1996, the fed-
eral government introduced Bill C-47, An Act Respecting Human Reproductive 
Technologies and Commercial Transactions Relating to Human Reproduction 
(in short, The Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act), providing 
Ibid., at 53. 
58 Ibid., at 50 
59 Ibid., at 52. 
60 Ibid., at 107. 
61  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
62 Supra, note 55 at 108. 
63 Ibid.,atll5-16. 
64 
Health Canada, News Release 1996-44 (Ottawa, 14 June 1996). See J. Woodard "Policy Ex-
perimentation in a Petri Dish" (14 August, 1995) 10:30 Western Report 36. See also New Re-
productive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health (Ottawa: Supply and Services 
Canada, 1996) at 24-26. Marleau's narrow response may have been directly related to the Royal 
Commission's position against a general moratorium; see Royal Commission, ibid., at IS. 
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for criminal sanctions for the most serious acts including those named in the 
moratorium. The Bill would prohibit "practices that commercialize reproduction 
or are inconsistent with the principles of human dignity, including the buying 
and selling of eggs and sperm, sex selection for non-medical reasons, and com-
mercial surrogacy."65 
Bill C-47, if enacted, would have prohibited specific genetic manipulation, 
the payment of surrogate mothers, the purchase and sale of reproductive mate-
rials, and the use of ovum without consent. Section 3 lists the Bill's objects: 
(a) to protect the health and safety of Canadians in the use of human reproductive 
materials for assisted reproduction, other medical procedures and medical re-
search; 
(b) to ensure the appropriate treatment of human reproductive materials outside 
the body in recognition of their potential to form human life; and 
(c) to protect the dignity of all persons, in particular children and women, in rela-
tion to uses of human reproductive materials. 
The Bill C-47 would prohibit any person from knowingly [to paraphrase s. 4(1)] 
manipulating ova or embryos; fertilizing animals with human sperm, or vice 
versa; fusing animal and human embryos, or implanting animal embryos into 
humans, or vice versa; altering the genetic structure of gametes and embryos if 
such alteration is secjiiddfenerations; retrievTr 
thovum or sperm from a fetus or cada fthThTiFifiöii6ffriáuring, fertil- 
izing or implanting 1hiim --n a woman ii isid the hurñàn body; using 
techniques to ascertain and/or select the sex of the embryo, other than for 
reasons related to health; maintaining an embryo outside the human body; or 
causing the fertilization of an ovum outside the human body for purposes of 
research. Sections 4(2) and (3) would also prohibit a person from offering or 
giving consideration to carry out any procedure above. Moreover, s. 5 would 
preclude any person from giving or offering consideration to a woman to act as 
a surrogate mother, or to any person acting as an intermediary in obtaining such 
services. Section 6(1) would also prohibit the selling, purchasing, bartering, or 
exchanging of gametes, embryos and fetuses. Furthermore, the donor's consent 
for the specific use of sperm or ovum would be required under ss. 7(1) and (2). 
It may also be implied that the consent of both donors is necessary for the spe-
cific use of embryos for research or implantation in a woman. Section 2 defines 
a "donor" as "the person who produces the ova or sperm, whether or not for 
purposes of donation." Bill C-47 would also establish a range of punishment 
from serious fines to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years. 
Bill C-47 received a range of responses, including much criticism of the gov-
ernment's use of criminal prohibitions.60 For example, the Canadian Bar Asso- 
65  Health Canada, ibid.; Bill C-47, Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act, 2nd Sess., 
35th Parl., 1996, ss. 3-7. 
66  See the Canadian Bar Association, "Submission on Bill C-47"; A. Young, "Brief Prepared for 
the Standing Committee on Health on Bill C-47; P. Healy, "Statutory Prohibitions and the 
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ciation ("CBA") strongly criticized the use of absolute criminal prohibitions for 
failing to balance "individual autonomy" and "the dangers inherent in the use of 
the technology."" They also discussed concerns for the "chilling effect" on re-
search and clinical practice. The CBA supported policy guidelines that would 
allocate a determinative role to the professions in self-regulation and to patient 
autonomy. While supporting scientific freedom, the CBA criticized several 
provisions of Bill C-47 for their "highly scientific" and "inaccessible" language. 
The CBA expressed concern over the "complexity, overbreadth and lack of 
precision" of the legislation in particular given the absolute criminal prohibi-
tions. The CBA recommended a "simpler, clearer, and more precise definition 
of offences," with the integration of popular terms and scientific description." 
The law, the CBA noted, must be kept abreast of "evolving scientific and social 
norms."69 Bill C-47 was also criticized for its lack of focus and unenforceabil-
ity.7° According to another commentator, a regulatory framework seems prefer-
able to the use of criminal law sanctions, which may create an underground 
market for human reproduction .7' A regulatory framework might better support 
women's reproductive autonomy, while avoiding problems in reaching a public 
consensus, the unavailability of donors, and the potential exploitation of women 
within an underground market.72 
At the same time as the introduction of Bill C-47, the federal government 
published a White Paper, entitled New Reproductive Technologies: Setting 
Boundaries, Enhancing Health" promising to establish a regulatory body and 
framework within which the regulation of acceptable practices would take place. 
The White Paper set forth boundaries for public discussion about an appropriate 
"legislative and regulatory infrastructure."' The paper identified several guiding 
ethical principles for a policy framework: balancing individual and collective 
interests; equality; protecting the vulnerable; appropriate use of medical treat-
ment; non-commercialization of reproduction and reproductive materials; and 
accountability." A two-step enactment process was proposed for legislation that 
would eventually combine prohibitions (under Bill C-47) and regulatory con-
trols to provide for "a comprehensive management regime for new reproductive 
and genetic technologies."" Any such regime would promote a multidisciplinary 
approach, and would be established under an agency removed from central gov- 
Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies Under Federal Law in Canada" (1995) 40 
McGill L.J. 905. 
67 Canadian Bar Association, ibid. 
68  Ibid., at 12. 
69  Ibid., at 16. 
70  Ibid. 
71 Healy, supra, note 66. 
72 Young, supra, note 66. The Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. Morgenraler, [1988] 1 
S.C.R. 30 has often been cited for constitutional support of a woman's reproductive autonomy 
in the context of abortion. 
° See New Reproductive Technologies: Setting Boundaries, Enhancing Health, supra, note 64. 
" mid. 
Ibid., at 15-17. 
76  Ibid., at 27. 
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ernment.77  The proposed regime would centre on the issuance of licences for 
various new reproductive and genetic technologies and related practices, and the 
establishment of appropriate standards by a range of enforcement mechanisms, 
as well as information registries and health surveillance procedures. In what 
seems to be a response to the uncertainty over division of powers, or a new 
trend of intergovernmental co-operation, the Federal government offered to sus-
pend federal regulatory controls in provinces with substantially similar controls. 
This type of option would seem to increase flexibility in federal-provincial rela-
tions while upholding general uniformity in the regulation of new reproductive 
and genetic technologies. 
Under the various pressures of an upcoming federal election, however, the 
proposed regime failed to materialize and Bill C-47 died on the order paper. It 
appears that the voluntary moratorium will continue in effect until the enactment 
of appropriate legislation. The issue thus remains alive as to whether a prohibi-
tory regime under criminal law, a regulatory regime, or some combination, 
would best provide a flexible means for social control of RTs - one that best 
adapts to changing technologies and social norms. 
UN III NO)r U iI Il 
Prior to legislative drafting, governments must consider constitutional dimen-
sions. RTs must be regulated according to the division of powers of the Consti-
tution Act, 1867, and must also meet the guarantees under the Charter. 
1. Division of Powers 
Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, set forth the division of pow-
ers between the federal and provincial governments. Section 91 distributes legis-
lative jurisdiction to the federal government as a matter of "national interest and 
concern" under the criminal law [s. 91(27)], trade and commerce [s. 91(2)], 
taxation [s. 91(3)], federal spending (as inferred from various sections), and 
treaty powers (as inferred), as well as the residual category of peace, order and 
good government.79  Under s. 92, the provinces have legislative jurisdiction for 
matters of property and civil rights [s. 92(13)], hospitals [s. 92(7)], and the re-
sidual category of matters of a merely local or private nature in the province s. 
92(16)]. The courts have generally recognized that Parliament or the provincial 
legislatures have jurisdiction over a specific area if it falls in "pith and sub-
stance" under an enumerated category. However, the constitutionality of federal 
or provincial legislation is not undermined where the legislation has an inciden-
tal effect on other enumerated categories. As well, the courts have recognized 
Ibid. 
78 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
79 M. Jackman, "The Constitution and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies," in 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, vol. 3, Overview of Legal Issues in 
New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1993) 1. 
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that a matter may have a "double aspect" in that it falls under provincial juris-
diction for one purpose, and federal jurisdiction for another purpose.8° 
It has been argued that the very fact the federal government initiated the 
Royal Commission is evidence enough to pull it under federal jurisdiction as a 
"national concern."8' Parliament may also find the power to regulate RTs under 
other areas, including criminal law, trade and commerce, taxing, federal spend-
ing, and treaty powers. Parliament could possibly regulate reproductive tech-
nologies under the Canada Health Act.82 However, even if the federal govern-
ment can regulate RTs under one or more of these categories, the provinces may 
nonetheless regulate incidental effects under, for example, their powers over 
hospitals and health plans. 
The federal and provincial governments have not yet formally addressed is-
sues of standardization and uniformity for the definition and treatment of infer-
tility, access criteria, and funding of RTs. It remains to be seen in which ways 
mutual co-operation will be required of federal and provincial governments, in 
light of the Constitution Act, 1867. A regulatory framework at the federal level 
may address not only the rapidly changing RTs and social norms, but also 
changing tensions between federal-provincial relations. It seems, nevertheless, 
that many unfolding issues concerning the regulation and effects of RTs, and 
particularly the uncertainty in the use and disposition of human "materials," are 
best a matter for legislatures (as a more representative body) and not the elite 
institutions of courts. 
2. The Charter 
The Charter guarantees rights and freedoms except where the government can 
show reasonable and demonstrable justification in a free and democratic society. 
The Charter only applies to government conduct and legislation; it does not 
directly concern private activities." The governmental regulation of RTs may 
face Charter scrutiny under various sections, including s. 7 (the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person) and s. 15 (equality). There are a number of 
issues involving the use of RTs which are likely to require Charter analysis, 
among these are: the "right" to biological parenthood through the use of and 
access to RTs, and whether or not the rights and interests of surrogate mothers, 
gamete donors, embryos and fetuses may be recognized under the Charter. In 
the absence of Canadian jurisprudence, some limited guidance may be gathered 
from American and other foreign jurisprudence on similar constitutional issues. 
We will address Charter issues, specifically the issue of access through a right 
80 For an interesting and detailed discussion, see Jackman, ibid. 
81 Ibid., at 5. 
82 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6. 
83 See Eldridge v. British Columbia (AG.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (equality of rights for disabled's 
access to sign language interpreters as covered under a publicly funded scheme and where the 
Medical Services Commission has discretion over the expenditure and thus provision of medi-
cal care services). 
to biological parenthood, and the issue of legal status of gametes and embryos, 
as they arise over subsequent sections in this chapter. 
Canadian courts at common law have not yet had the opportunity to directly 
consider the regulation of reproductive technologies. However, several cases 
have dealt indirectly with the standards for medical practice concerning repro-
ductive technologies and the status and quality of sperm donation. In Korn v. 
Potter" the British Columbia Supreme Court affirmed a human rights tribunal 
decision that a physician's refusal to provide artificial insemination to a lesbian 
couple was discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation. The court noted 
that discrimination could not be sanctioned merely on the basis that other phy-
sicians provided the same services. 
In ter Neuzen v. Korn85 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the case of a 
woman who underwent artificial insemination and contracted HIV through the 
donated semen. She claimed negligence against her physician, and that the pre-
vailing medical standards were inappropriate. She also argued the existence of 
an implied condition or warranty under contract law and the Sale of Goods Act.86 
The Court affirmed the presence of two fundamental aspects of a claim of pro-
fessional negligence: (1) breach of duty arising from the failure to be aware of 
the risk of HIV infection through the use of artifical insemination; and (2) 
breach of duty with respect to the screening and follow-up of donors. The Court 
also, for the first time, faced the issue of whether an implied warranty exists at 
common law that semen be of merchantable quality and fit for its purpose. The 
Court first rejected the argument under the Sale of Goods Act, which only ap-
plies if a contract existed for the sale of "primarily" goods rather than medical 
services.87  The Court then considered the specific nature of the contract and the 
relationship between the parties in order to determine whether the parties in-
tended to imply such a warranty at common law. The Court noted the medical 
context and vulnerability of physicians, stating that "it must be recognized 
that biological products such as blood and semen, unlike manufactured prod-
ucts, carry certain inherent risks  .,,88  The Court held that no implied warranty 
of fitness and merchantability could exist in the circumstances, and if such a 
warranty did exist, it would be met by the physician's reasonable care.89 The 
(1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 437 (B.C.S.C.). 
85 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674. 
86 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 410. 
87 The Court, however, did not consider the issue of whether the sperm was donated rather than 
sold. 
80  Supra, note 85 at 717. 
89 It has been previously argued that the transfer of sperm should be legally characterized as a 
"sale" in order to resort to the protection of commercial law; A.M. Hodgson, "The Warranty of 
Sperm: A Modest Proposal to Increase the Accountability of Sperm Banks and Physicians in 
the Performance of Artificial Insemination Procedures" (1993) 175 Specialty Law Digest: 
Health Care Law 9. Hodgson claims that such characterization would hold sperm banks and 
physicians liable for breach of implied warranties. This argument, however, does not address 
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Supreme Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeal ruling, sending the case back Also included were questions about the couple's or individual's marital status, 
to trial, the presence of a partner, and sexual orientation." Individuals and couples may 
also face discriminatory barriers based on race and ethnicity. 
Access criteria tend to vary among, clinics and across orovinces. raisine con- 
Iii BJ D(IJI (iuJDLI]ZESMUi*iiI 
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Most individuals who seek access to RTs, do so because they wish to have a 
child and are either unable or unwilling to do so through sexual intercourse. Not 
all individuals who want to use RTs will be able to do so. Access to reproduc-
tive technologies may be limited by a number of considerations including, for 
example, formal or informal medical criteria and the high cost of treatment, in 
some circumstances, decisions about access to RTs will be made by physicians 
who screen applicants according to criteria established by private infertilit\ 
clinics or set out in professional guidelines. Provincial health insurance legisla-
tion may also provide a barrier to access by excluding certain forms of RTs as 
an insured service under provincial health care insurance plans."Legislatures 
may also enact legislation specifying who may have access to RTs and in what 
circumstances. Where individuals encounter such barriers which limit their ac-
cess to RTs, the barriers may be challenged under the Charter and/or provincial 
Human Rights Codes. While challenges under human rights legislation may 
provide recourse to individuals where the barrier to access is private action -- 
for example, the decision of a physician - a Charter challenge will only be 
available where access is limited by government action. We now focus on a few 
of the more likely Charter challenges under ss. 7 and 15 and their relevance to 
the regulation of RTs. 
B. EXISTING BARRIERS 
An individual or couple with the goal of increasing their chances for successful 
reproduction may approach a physician in a private fertility clinic or public 
hospital. The physician or clinic performs an assessment using a set of eligibility 
criteria to screen access to reproductive technologies. The physician or clinic 
must also determine whether the individual or couple would benefit overall from 
such assistance. The criteria typically centre on the potential benefits and risks 
to the health and safety of participants based on various medical factors, includ-
ing the condition of infertility and the participant's age. A number of studies 
have also identified other non-medical factors that some physicians have 
adopted as criteria to limit access to in vitro fertilization. These criteria include 
questions concerning an individual woman's or couple's ability to parent. Fac-
tors some practitioners considered relevant to successful parenting included: 
psychological immaturity; below average intelligence; physical disability; other 
children living with the prospective parents; low income; and place of residence. 
the inadequacies of commercial law in dealing with sensitive reproductive "materials" of a 
unique nature. 
90 See for example the Ontario Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 6. 
cerns over the uniformity of standards and mobility barriers based on ass.92 
The infertile may face additional impediments of treatment costs and physical 
location of fertility clinics. High treatment costs can prohibit the infertile, who 
lack the financial means and do not qualify for private or public health care in-
surance, from having access to RTs. Many individuals and couples who seek 
access to RTs depend upon health care insurance as their only economic means 
of funding access to RTs. However, few RTs are paid for under provincial 
health insurance schemes. In Ontario, for example, the Ontario Health Insur-
ance Plan ("OHIP") guidelines regulate such funding and thus establish access 
barriers. Women may access public funding for in vitro fertilization if they show 
"complete bilateral anatomical fallopian tube blockage."93  This effectively 
means deference to medical expertise and proof of bilateral blockage. Moreover, 
OHIP only provides funding for up to three complete cycles of in vitro fertiliza-
tion, and does not fund micro-manipulation techniques for the treatment of male 
infertility, such as intracytoplasmic sperm injection. It seems, therefore, that the 
definition and condition of infertility as a treatment response, as we previously 
discussed, shapes accessibility to health care funding. 
Any regulatory framework which limits access to RTs may face challenges un-
der the Charter. The Charter may be invoked to challenge statutory provisions 
and regulations that limit access directly on the basis of medical factors as well 
as those which restrict access indirectly on the basis of listed services under 
provincial health insurance plans. We can identify at least three clusters of 
constitutional arguments which could be invoked in order to gain access to RTs. 
Broadly speaking, an argument for a positive "right to procreate" may be con-
structed on the basis of s. 7 rights to liberty. Alternatively, access to reproduc-
tive technologies could be sought using s. 7 on the grounds that it includes the 
right to health care and that access to RTs is an instrinsic component of such a 
positive right to health care. Both these grounds require an affirmation of some 
positive right, i.e., either the right to procreate, or the right to health care. A 
third basis from which to challenge access to RTs is s. 15. Where government 
legislation or action provides some individuals access to RTs but not others, it 
91 Royal Commission, Proceed With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Repro- 
ductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992), at 552, citing T. 
Stephens & J. McLean, "Survey of Canadian Fertility Programs," Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, vol. 10 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) 
table 16. 
92 Royal Commission, ibid., at 552. 
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 552, amended to 0. Reg. 410/96, s. 23. 
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may be possible to claim discrimination where such access is denied to indi-
viduals who are members of an enumerated or analogous class under s. 15. This 
line of argument would claim access to RTs as a negative right. The categoriza-
tion of positive and negative rights is important in light of the Supreme Court of 
Canada's reluctance to recognize socio-economic rights under the Charter gen-
erally, and specifically, under s. 7. 
A Charter challenge places the onus on the parties seeking access to RTs to 
show that a right or freedom has been infringed in legislative purpose or effect. 
Once the infringement is established, the focus turns to s. 1 of the Charter where 
the onus shifts to the government to show that the legislation is reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The person seeking ac-
cess under s. 7 of the Charter must also demonstrate that the deprivation of life, 
liberty or security of the person is not in accordance with the principles of fun-
damental justice. Where a prescribed law, in purpose or effect, amounts to such 
a deprivation, then the analysis shifts to s. 1. 
Section 7 of the Charter states that: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in ac-
cordance with the principles of fundamental justice." The first analytical step is 
to determine whether life, liberty or security of the person has been deprived by 
legislation or government conduct. In light of recent trends in Canadian courts, 
the regulation of access to RTs is unlikely to fall within the right not to be de-
prived of life." In other words, Canadian courts have not yet shown any interest 
in supporting a right to biological parenthood as essential to one's life. 
A more fruitful line of argument might be to establish a positive right to pro-
create under Canadian constitutional law. A 1993 Report by the LRC of Canada 
discusses a positive right to procreate and concludes: "it seems likely that either 
liberty or security of the person, or both, will be found in a future case to in-
clude the right to procreate."95 The Charter does not expressly include a right to 
procreate; however, it has been argued if such a right exists in Canada, it is most 
likely to be protected within s. 7 of the Charter and more specifically could be 
encompassed by the right to liberty or security of the person. 
Section 7 has been raised in a reproductive context in two cases before the 
Supreme Court of Canada: R. v. Morgentaler" and E. (Mrs.) v. Eve.97 However, 
it is only in the former that the Court addressed substantive interests involving 
reproductive claims. Relying on an expansive interpretation of the right to lib-
erty, Wilson J. stated that the right to liberty in s. 7 of the Charter "guarantees to 
every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important decisions inti-
mately affecting their private lives."98  With respect to the decision whether to 
terminate a pregnancy, Wilson J. argued that: 
94  Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper 65) 
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) at 152. 
95  Ibid., at 164. 
96  [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
[19861 2 S.C.R. 388. 
98 Morgentaler, supra, note 96 at 171. In R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 at 318, Justice Wilson 
affirmed that this broad conception of liberty ought to be protected by s. 7. In Jones, the plain- 
This decision is one that will have profound psychological, economic and social 
consequences for the pregnant woman ... It is a decision that deeply reflects the 
way the woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and to society at 
large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical one as 
well. Her response to it will be the response of the whole person.99 
In protecting a sphere of reproductive liberty in relation to a woman's abortion 
decision, Wilson J. acknowledges that such a choice falls within the realm of 
decisions which are protected from state interference by the right to liberty. In 
articulating the conception of liberty protected by the Charter, Wilson J. relied 
upon a series of American cases which have held that the right to privacy, while 
not expressly enumerated in the American Constitution and its Amendments, is 
an aspect of the right to liberty and includes the right to procreate.'°° One could 
argue that Wilson J.'s conception of liberty in Morgentaler supports the view 
that a general prohibition on the use of RTs would constitute an infringement of 
s. 7 as such a prohibition could infringe personal autonomy over important de-
cisions that fundamentally affect the way a woman thinks about herself and her 
relationship to others. 
In E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether a court 
had the power, pursuant to its parens patriae jurisdiction, to authorize the con-
traceptive sterilization of a mentally disabled woman and whether such a sterili-
zation would be in the woman's best interests. In concluding that courts do not 
have jurisdiction to authorize a non-consensual sterilization for non-therapeutic 
purposes, La Forest J. writing for the Court stated that: 
The grave intrusion on a person's rights and the certain physical damage that en-
sues from non-therapeutic sterilization without consent, when compared to the 
highly questionable advantages that can result from it, have persuaded me that it 
can never safely be determined that such a procedure is for the benefit of that per- 
tiff argued that an Alberta legislative regime regarding educational instruction violated his pa-
rental rights to educate his own children as he saw fit contrary to the s. 7 right to liberty. In her 
dissent, Wilson J. stated at 318 that: 
I believe that the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing 'liberty' as a fundamental 
value in a free and democratic society had in mind the freedom of the individual to de-
velop and realize his potential to the full, to plan his own life to suit his own character, 
to make his own choices for good or ill ... to be ... 'his own person' and accountable as 
such. 
sn Morgentaler, supra, note 96 at 171. 
°° Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) at 541, holding that the forced sterilization of habit-
ual criminals violated the equal protection clause. In his opinion, Douglas J. characterized the 
right to reproduce as "one of the basic civil rights of man." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972) at 453, in which Brennan J. for the majority recognized that the right to privacy includes 
"the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child"; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) recognizing that the right to personal pri-
vacy includes the choice to use contraceptives to avoid procreation; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), recognizing the right to abortion as an aspect of the right to privacy. 
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son. Accordingly, the procedure should never be authorized for non-therapeutic 
purposes under the parens patriae jurisdiction."" 
In coming to this conclusion, La Forest J. did not find it necessary to rely on the 
Charter. Therefore, whether there is a constitutionally protected right to procre-
ate has yet to be determined. However, throughout his decision, La Forest J. did 
suggest that there was a "growing legal recognition of the fundamental character 
of the right to procreate "102 and that a non-consensual sterilization would Consti-
tute a deprivation of this right. As noted by the LRC: 
Justice La Forest pointed out the "growing legal recognition of the fundamental 
character of the right to procreate," "the great privilege of giving birth," and "[t]he 
importance of maintaining the physical integrity of a human being ... particularly 
as it affects the privilege of giving life." He characterized the proposed steriliza-
tion as a "grave intrusion on a person's rights" and an "irreversible and serious in-
trusion on the basic rights of the individual."" 
It remains to be seen whether Canadian courts will accept an interpretation of s. 
7 that supports individual autonomy in procreation. Moreover, even if the courts 
were to find a right to procreate protected by s. 7 of the Charter, this right may 
be viewed as a negative right - the right to be able to procreate without state 
interference - and not a positive right to medically assisted procreation. 
Unless the Charter protects a right to procreate, arguably, the question of 
whether government has a positive obligation to make RTs generally available 
does not arise. This is not to suggest that if the government does enact legisla-
tion or regulations, or take action to provide or regulate RTs, that such action 
will not be subject to Charter scrutiny particularly under s. 15. It may be argued 
by some however, that s. 7 should be interpreted as creating a positive right to 
basic social services, including the right to health care.'°4 The claim is that such 
services are fundamental to protecting the values of life, liberty and security of 
the person enshrined in the Charter. However, even if s. 7 of the Charter is 
found to guarantee the right to health care, it is unlikely that access to RTs 
would be included under the framework of protected services. Rather, it is likely 
that a distinction will be drawn between basic health care services which are 
necessary to sustain life and basic well-being, and those services such as RTs, 
whose absence, while impoverishing one's quality of life, do not threaten life 
101 Supra, note 97 at 431. 
1112 Ibid., at 419-20. 
103 Law Reform Commission, supra, note 94 at 163. 
06 See generally, M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter" (1988) 20 
Ottawa L. Rev. 257; I. Morrison, "Security of the Person and the Person in Need: Section 7 and 
the Right to Welfare" (1988) 4 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 33: I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charter 
and the Right to Welfare" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1; M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the 
Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 65; B.F. Windwick, 
"Health-Care and Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1994) 3:1 
Health L. Rev. 20; Canadian Bar Association, Task Force on Health Care, What's Law Got To 
Do With It?: Health Care Reform in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1994). 
itself. Therefore, it is not likely that the courts will interpret the Charter in a 
manner which requires legislatures to provide access to RTs. However, where 
governments do undertake to legislate with respect to the delivery of RTs, the 
Charter may be invoked to ensure that this is carried out in a manner consistent 
With s. 15. 
Section 15 of the Charter provides a basis upon which to argue for non-
discriminatory access to reproductive technologies. Section 15(1) states that 
"[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in par-
ticular without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability  .11115  A law must not discrimi-
nate on enumerated or analogous grounds by design or by impact against par-
ticular individuals or groups. One could argue that the infertile as a group are 
discriminated against as a matter of "physical disability." Grounds for access 
would entail arguing that this group is prevented by the state from having chil-
dren despite the existence of a remedy in the form of medical treatment using 
RTs. However, even if the court finds infertility to be a physical disability and 
that the infertile are discriminated against as a class, this need not result in man-
datory access to RTs. The court may hold that alternative remedies (such as 
adoption, for example) are available to mitigate this form of discrimination. 
Where access to RTs is available only as an uninsured medical service, there 
may be grounds to challenge the lack of provision of publicly insured access on 
the grounds of socio-economic discrimination. However, since s. 15 properly 
applies only to areas of positive state action, it would be difficult to employ un-
less it could be found that the decision not to fund access to RTs was deliber-
ately discriminatory. 
A more likely line of argument, therefore, would be to apply s. 15 to those 
individuals and groups who are currently denied access to RTs under provincial 
eligibility criteria, where, for example, provinces provide and insure access to 
some but not to other couples or individuals. Access criteria which rely upon a 
particular definition of infertility may be more susceptible to challenge under s. 
15. Where these definitions appear to rule out or exclude certain groups, for 
example, single lesbians, or lesbians in a conjugal relationship, but allow access 
to married heterosexual couples there may be grounds for a finding of discrimi-
nation.106  The infertile may claim analogous grounds under s. 15(1), particularly 
on the basis of social, political and legal disadvantage.  101 To the extent that in-
fertility, by whatever cause, constitutes a disability, by providing access to RTs 
to some groups but not others, the state may be construed to have favoured the 
reproductive opportunities of some groups over others either by action or non- 
105 See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
106 See Royal Commission, supra, note 91 at 426-38. Another issue not yet considered by the 
courts is whether or not gay men can legally access RTs, for example, by way of surrogacy ar-
rangements, in hopes of creating a new form of family. 
107 See M. Jackman, "The Constitution and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies" in 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, vol. 3, Overview of Legal Issues in 
New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1993) at 24-25. 
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action. Economic arguments of budget constraint may not be used to systemati-
cally favour particular groups over others. 
Provincial authorities (and indeed hospitals) may not be protected against 
charges of discrimination by resorting to the argument that access criteria are 
based on strictly medical-scientific factors. Some argue that where access 
criteria for in vitro fertilization, for example, are based strictly on medical 
infertility, then discrimination is unlikely to occur.'°8 Such arguments ignore 
the bias inherent in these criteria, which may mask the subjective preferences 
and social prejudices both of those who devise such criteria as well as those 
medical practitioners who apply them. The Royal Commission formally rec-
ommended that: "[a]ccess to in vitro fertilization treatment be determined on 
the basis of legitimate medical criteria, without discrimination on the basis of 
factors such as marital status, sexual orientation, or economic status."°9 It re-
mains unclear how the Royal Commission would separate, if possible, criteria 
involving both biological and social dimensions. In any event, the Royal 
Commission has provided guidance in its sharp criticism of discriminatory 
barriers to access RTs. 
A recent case has been brought before the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in-
volving a s. 15 challenge to the access criteria applied under the Nova Scotia 
Health Services and Insurance Act"' for the provision of in vitro fertilization 
and intracytoplasmic sperm injection."' The plaintiff argued that the failure to 
provide intracytoplasmic sperm injection constituted discrimination on the 
grounds of disability. In Cameron v. Nova Scotia (A.G.),"2 Kennedy C.J. pre-
sented a lengthy discussion on the relative ineffectiveness and newness of in 
vitro fertilization and intracytoplasmic sperm injection before ruling that these 
procedures are not "medically necessary" or "medically required.""' It was 
noted that the policy underlying the Nova Scotia Health Services and Insurance 
Act, as a product of consultation between the government and the medical soci-
ety, represents a reasonable method for the establishment of health priorities and 
the allocation of limited funding."' In response to the couple's Charter ss. 7 and 
15 arguments, it was held that the policy makes a distinction in law that is not 
discriminatory on the basis of physical disability. Justice Kennedy stated: "the 
non-funding is based on the nature of the treatment being sought, rather than the 
personal characteristics of those persons seeking the funding, the infertile ."5 It 
was further noted that to find that public funding of particular medical services 
falls under Charter s. 7 (right to life, liberty or security of the person) would 
58 Law Reform Commission, supra, note 94 at 196. The Royal Commission supports the separa- 
tion of medical and social factors; supra, note 91 at 174. 
109 Royal Commission, supra, note 91 at 554. 
"° R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 197. 
" See Cameron v. Nova Scotia (AG.), (1997), 163 N.S.R. (2d) 391 (S.C.). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., atpara. 86. 
" Ibid., atpara. 171. 
Ibid., atpara. 154. 
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expand the parameters of judicial review.  116  In finding that Charter ss. 7 and 15 
were not infringed, Kennedy C.J. did not undertake a s. 1 analysis. This case 
illustrates the kinds of grounds upon which s. 15 may be used by individuals to 
ain access to RTs, and underlines the relevance of constitutional jurisprudence 
to the problem of access to RTs in Canada. 
If s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter have been infringed by prescribed law, then the 
onus shifts to the government under s. 1 to show that its limits are reasonable 
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  117  Canadian courts 
have not yet had the opportunity to scrutinize access criteria under the s. 1 
Oakes test of rational connection, minimal impairment and proportionality."' 
For example, the purpose or objective of government legislation might be to 
ameliorate discrimination against infertile women and men as a group who have 
suffered an historical disadvantage."' It may be that "medically required serv-
ices" under a public insurance scheme must be available to the infertile in the 
context of a health care system with finite resources. It has also been argued that 
such a determination should include the medical effects of the condition, the 
effectiveness of treatment, alternative treatments and relative costs."' On the 
other hand, one might argue that access to RTs as a "required service" to over-
come the condition of infertility should be available to the rich and the poor 
alike on the basis of reasonable access to a publicly-funded health insurance 
system. 
SJ I 1111X4J l 
Access to RTs by infertile individuals requires adequate information and 
counselling upon which to base a decision and consent to treatment. Consent 
to RTs involves a two-way process where formal or informal access criteria 
are applied by physicians, and where women and men have the opportunity to 
choose freely to accept the use of RTs. Inadequate or lack of relevant infor- 
" Ibid., atpara. 160. 
117 The basic framework for as. 1 analysis has been set forth in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
118 R. v. Oakes, ibid. The analytical framework for determining whether a statutory provision is a 
reasonable limit demonstrably justifiable under s. 1 has been summarized in Egan v. Canada, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 605 per lacobucci J., as recently quoted with approval by La Forest J. in 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (AG.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 684, and by Cory and lacobucci JJ. 
in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at 554: 
A limitation to a constitutional guarantee will be sustained once two conditions are met. 
First, the objective of the legislation must be pressing and substantial. Second, the 
means chosen to attain this legislative end must be reasonable and demonstrably justifi-
able in a free and democratic society. In order to satisfy the second requirement, three 
criteria must be satisfied: (1) the rights violation must be rationally connected to the aim 
of the legislation; (2) the impugned provision must minimally impair the Charter guar-
antee; and (3) there must be a proportionality between the effect of the measure and its 
objective so that the attainment of the legislative goal is not outweighed by the 
abridgement of the right. In all s. 1 cases the burden of proof is with the government to 
show on a balance of probabilities that the violation is justifiable. 
119 See Law Reform Commission, supra, note 94 at 189. 
120 See Cameron, supra, note 111. 
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mation concerning the potential benefits, costs, and risks of RTs, as well as B STATUS OF GAMETES AND EMBRYOS 
prejudiced forms of communication, might influence an individual's choice to 
use RTs. It is important, therefore, that the communications between physi A couple that decides to reproduce using RTs may part company, or one or both 
cians and prospective patients remain mutually open and accessible. Consent 
to RTs depends upon these communications. Moreover, it is through such 
communications, necessary for informed consent, that non-visible discrimina-
tory factors may become influential. In current practice, physicians may, un-
der the facade of "legitimate medical criteria," inquire about the person's life-
style, including sexual history and orientation. Keeping in mind that two 
chapters in this text are devoted to consent, we now explore specific issues in 
the context of RTs. 
The common law in Canada requires that a physician obtaina patient's in-
formed consent prior to performing a medical procedure on that patient."' This 
means that the patient must be informed about the benefits and risks of treat-
ment, alternative courses of action, and the consequences of not having the 
treatment. Moreover, the standard for disclosure is not what the reasonable 
physician would see fit to disclose, but what the reasonable person in the pa-
tient's position would want to know.122  The relevant information for in vitro 
fertilization, for example, would include success rates of the procedure, includ-
ing a clarification of the meaning of success rates (i.e., conception or live birth). 
Patients should also be informed about the potential for multiple births and the 
possibility of low birth-weight babies in addition to other social factors and fi-
nancial costs. The precise nature of the information to be communicated by the 
physician to the patient under informed consent in the context of reproductive 
technologies has not been established by case law. 
The physician may inform the patients directly, or refer them to counsel-
lors. Independent counselling might avoid some concerns over a physician's 
potential bias in providing treatment services. Moreover, independent coun-
selling may support the timely provision of needed information on new and 
changing reproductive technologies. The Royal Commission recognized the 
importance of patients having "time to discuss and fully comprehend the 
meaning and implications of consent," and that consent should be revocable 
"at any stage of treatment without jeopardizing future care or treatment. "123 
The Royal Commission recommended a standardization of informative mate-
rials, including alternatives to treatment, such as adoption and living without 
children. 
121 Reibl v. Hughes (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) provides the authoritative statement on the 
law of informed consent in Canada. See also the Ontario Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO. 
1996, c. 2, Sch. A., which supersedes the common law in its broad application to treatment. 
Section 2 of the Act defines treatment as "anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, 
palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related purpose includes [sic] a course of treat-
ment or plan of treatment." 
122 Ibid. 
123 Royal Commission, supra, note 91 at 550. 
or tnem may use, at some stage oi reproduction. iney iiiigui nave piaeeu Men 
gametes (sperm and ova) separately in storage banks, or have already generated 
an embryo also frozen and stored in a bank. In difficult cases, courts may be 
called upon to determine the status of gametes and embryos, and who should 
have an interest in, and dispositional control over them - that is, who should 
have the power to control human reproductive materials and ultimately, human 
Lploduction along specific genetic fines The law may protect the rights and 
inteieiisoI the (the genetic contributors) of reproductive materials 
jitiL"parents," the biomedical researchers and clinical physicians 
wh-ypfer the materials and help generate products of conception,  hospitals 
bind the owners ol storage and handling facilities the interests of these 
• 6ducts' as potential life forms, and law 
might be called upon to address such issues in the staging and evaluation of life-
forming processes, from pre-conception arrangements to the definition of death. 
The framing of the legal issues which arise will depend upon whether or not 
gametes and embryos are considered as property, persons, or something in-
between. The following section explores law's responses to the status of repro-
ductive "materials" (sperm and ova) and the "products" of conception (zygotes, 
embryos, and fetuses)."' The primary issue of the status of gametes and embryos 
implicates a range of existing law including: property, contracts, wills and trusts, 
torts, criminal law and constitutional law. 
1. A Property Approach 
One approach to the characterization of gametes and embryos focuses on the 
concept of property.'25 Property refers not to physical objects, but to "rights of 
control or domination" over objects or activities. A traditional property ap-
proach treats sperm, ova, and embryos as objects to be controlled like any other. 
The reason for this treatment as objects centres on their generation as a product 
124 The following section focuses on gametes, zygotes (pre-embryos), and embryos. For a more 
detailed discussion on fetuses, see chap er 9, "State Intervention in the Lives of Pregnant 
Women." 
125 See M. Litman & G. Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime Appro-
priate?" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Overview of Legal Issues in 
New Reproductive Technologies, Research vol. 3 (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 
1993) at 233; M. Litman & G. Robertson, "The Common Law Status of Genetic Material;" in 
B. Knoppers, T. Caulfield & T.D. Kinsella, cdi., Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material 
(Toronto Emond Montgomery,  1996) at 51 IA' Hirtle Civil Law and the Status of Human 
Genetic Material, in Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material," in B. Knoppers, T. Caulfield 
& T.D. Kinsella, eds., ibid., at 85; 1. Kennedy, "The Moral Status of the Embryo," in I. Ken-
nedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 
119; B. Steinbock, "Sperm as Property" (1995) 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 57; B. Brown, 
"Reconciling Property Law With Advances in Reproductive Science" (1995) 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y 
Rev. 73; D. Walther, " 'Ownership' of the Fertilized Ovum In Vitro" (1992)26 Fam. L.Q. 235. 
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of one's body and the fact that they are alienable from it. According to some 
proponents of a property model, each individual is said to have dominion and 
control over her or his body, including its derivatives such as blood, sperm, ova 
and embryos. 126 It has also been argued that each individual should have the 
right to exclusively control the uniquely identifying information contained in 
her or his genes. The argument in favour of viewing the body and its parts as 
property is supported by the understanding that property is considered uniquely 
personal and therefore private.'27 If my body and its parts do not belong to me, 
then to whom do they belong? The primary motivation in favour of regarding 
gametes and embryos as property therefore, is to ensure that the individual or 
individuals who generated them has the full power to control their ultimate use. 
Alternatively, some academics argue in favour of quasi-property approaches 
where, for example, gametes would have special status as property.'28 A quasi-
property approach might affirm personal control and rights over disposition of 
gametes and/or embryos, but deny the right to alienate these materials for com-
mercial purposes or for remuneration. By considering policy issues in relation to 
the specific facts of the case, one might locate the status of gametes and em-
bryos somewhere along the spectrum ranging from traditional property, to a 
unique form of quasi-property with the potential for life. By the former charac-
terization, the individual's ownership of gametes would focus on possession to 
the exclusion of all others; as such, gametes would be alienable according to the 
expressed wishes of their owners. Moreover, an object may be property (in its 
weakest form, without all traditional incidents) for some purposes but not oth-
ers.'29 The potential suspension of reproductive stages, and the recognition of a 
form of potential life, generates obvious concerns of de-humanization. By re-
moving embryos and ova from the body, the only place where they had existed 
prior to the avent of RTs, a de facto condition of objectification is created. 
While the legal characterization of human reproductive materials has not been 
considered in Canada, it has in other jurisdictions. 
In Hecht v. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los 
Angeles (Kane), "I the California Court of Appeal held that cryopreserved sperm 
was a "unique category of property" as part of the estate of the deceased do-
nor.'3' The value of the donor's sperm arose from its potential to generate life 
126 See Litman & Robertson, Genetic Material, ibid., at 60; Litman & Robertson, Reproductive 
Technology, ibid., at 250. 
127 For example, see Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 249 Cal.Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 
1988), in Litman & Robertson, Reproductive Technology, ibid., at 251-53. 
128 See Litman & Robertson, Reproductive Technology, ibid., at 232, 247 (the authors support a sui 
generis approach, using examples such as law's dealing with human corpses). 
129 Litman & Robertson, Genetic Material, supra, note 125 at 67. 
'° 20 Cal.Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
13 
1 The court in Hecht ibid., cited for persuasive support, among others, the decision of Paraplaix 
v. CECOS T.G.I. Creteil, August 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais, September 15, 1984 (France) 
(widow sought disposition of decendent's sperm stored in a sperm bank). See, infra, note 186. 
The court in Hecht v. Superior Court, Kane 20 Cal.Rptr. 2d 275, 288-89 (1993) (C.A.) cited in 
Paraplaix as an example where a court rejected traditional property and contract analyses, fo-
cusing instead on the husband's unequivocable intentions to have a child after his death. 
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Upon fertilization, thus providing the donor an interest "in the nature of owner-
ship." In Davis v. Davis,"' the court directly confronted the issue of whether 
oryopreserved pre-embryos are property. The Davis couple underwent in vitro 
fertilization, storing their pre-embryos for later use. They eventually divorced, 
leading to a custody battle over the "frozen" pre-embryos. Ms. Davis sought to 
implant the embryos. She argued the "best interests of the child" test, and that 
the pre-embryos were in fact "living persons." In opposition, Mr. Davis con-
tended that the pre-embryos were under joint control. Justice Young of the Ten-
nessee Circuit Court ruled in favour of parens patriae jurisdiction and the fam-
ily law approach emphasizing the "best interests of the child," and thus rejecting 
a traditional property approach.'33 In rejecting the "bailment" approach of York 
v. Jones,"' Justice Young focused on a "minority" scientific opinion, suggesting 
that the differentiation of cells in such embryos means that they are fully consti-
tuted, "living persons." When faced with legal classification, Young J. relied 
upon medical science, in the absence of much discussion about the problems of 
deference to medical science and the lack of critical inquiry and challenge.'35 
By the time the case reached the Court of Appeal, both parties had re-
married. Ms. Davis no longer wished to implant the pre-embryos, but instead 
wanted to donate them to other women. Thus, the facts and perhaps the support 
of public policy had changed direction. The Court of Appeal reversed the previ-
ous ruling, awarding instead joint control over the pre-embryos. In the Davis 
case, the ex utero pre-embryos were frozen at an early stage of development. 
The American Court recognized that Mr. Davis had a "constitutionally protected 
right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place ."36 Some academ-
ics have argued that the Davis analysis sounds "suspiciously property-like."37 
And yet, the court's reference to the fact that the embryos had been created but 
not yet implanted supports Ms. Davis' reproductive contribution in relation to 
the father. At the same time, the court recognized the father's contribution and 
his wish not to proceed. In the end, the husband received a complete "veto" over 
132 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). See also K. Luongo, "The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the 
Protection of 'Potential Life'?" (1995) 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 1011; T. Feliciano, "Note: Davis v. 
Davis: What About Future Disputes?" (1993) 26 Conn. L. Rev. 305; R. Muller, "Note: Davis v. 
Davis: The Applicability of Privacy and Property Rights to the Disposition of Frozen Preem-
bryos in Intrafarnilial Disputes" (1993) 24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 763; M. Simon, "Note: 'Honey, I 
Froze the Kids": Davis v. Davis and the Legal Status of Early Embryos" (1991) 23 Lay. U. 
Chi. L.J. 131. 
133 Davis v. Davis, W.L. 140495 (Term. Cir. Ct. 1989); revd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1990); affd, 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), partial reh'g granted, W.L. 341632 (Tenn. 1992), 
cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. 1993). 
'' 717 F. Supp. 421 (ED. Va. 1989) (a property-based approach where the court upheld the trans-
fer of pre-embryos between fertilization institutes). 
'° See Litman & Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra, note 125 at 259. The authors note 
that scientific arguments are not determinative of this particular legal issue. See Tremblay v. 
Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 at 553. See generally, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (AG.), 
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. 
136 59  U.S.L.W. 2205 (Tenn. Ct. App., 1990) at 2206. 
137 Litman & Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra, note 125 at 260. 
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the disposition of the frozen ex utero pre-embryos. The Tennessee Supreme 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeal decision."' The court, however, noted that 
"pre-embryos are not, strictly speaking, either "persons" or "property," but oc-
cupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.""' The court focussed on the Davis' interest "in the 
nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decisional authority ,"4" in light 
of a balance of opposing interests by the two genetic contributors. The court in 
Davis thus seems to suggest two exceptions to the right of one progenitor In 
veto parenthood: (1) where one parent cannot otherwise become a parent; (2) a 
prior agreement between the parties indicating their clear intentions for the dis-
position of embryos. 
In Canada, the courts have yet to decide on the issue of whether or not repro-
ductive materials should be considered as "property.""' Federal legislation, such 
as the Food and Drugs Act' 42 and the Excise Tax Act"' tend to invoke the lan-
guage of property in that sperm may be "possessed" and "owned." It can be 
argued that gametes and embryos are human tissues and therefore fall under 
human tissue legislation. The Human Tissue Gift Act, " limits the transfer of 
human "tissue," which "includes an organ, but does not include any skin, bone, 
blood, blood constituent or other tissue that is replaceable by natural processes 
of repair," providing for "gifts" only.'45 The Quebec civil law basically adheres 
to the principle that the human body is not for sale; the law has not yet decided 
upon such issues as "ownership" of body parts) The Civil Code of Quebec" 
("CCQ") does not specifically address the issue of the ownership of donated 
embryos. Article 19 of the CCQ states that "[a] person of full age who is capable 
of giving his consent may alienate a part of his body inter vivos, provided the 
risk incurred is not disproportionate to the benefit that may reasonably be an-
ticipated." This form of risk balancing requires judges to carefully consider ex-
ternal sources in order to avoid, if possible, indeterminacy. 
138 Davis v. Davis, supra, note 132. 
's" Ibid., at 597. 
"° Ibid. See Litman & Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra, note 125 at 79. 
" Litman & Robertson, Reproductive Technology, ibid., at 51. Litman and Robertson warn of the 
symbolic and psychological effects on persons whose genetic materials and information are 
characterized as property. 
142 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. 
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-is. 
' For example, see Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 20, s. 1; Human Tissue Gift Act, 
R.S.A. 1980, c. H-12, s. 1(b); Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211,s. 1. But see also 
CCQ 1991, c. 64, art. 19, which states that a capable person may "... alienate a part of his [sic] 
body only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no serious risk to his [sic] 
health results." Article 20 of the CCQ requires that "[t]he alienation must be gratuitous unless 
its object is a part of the body susceptible to regeneration." 
145 For more examples, see other provincial legislation: ibid. 
146 M. Ouellette, 'The Civil Code of Quebec and New Reproductive Technologies," in Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Research vol. 3, Overview of Legal Issues to 
New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993) 625 at 643. 
'° S.Q. 1991, c. 64 (CCQ). 
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Under s. 223(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada,  141  "a child becomes a hu-
man being ... when it has completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body 
of its mother." A fetus, and thus, by extension, gametes and embryos, cannot be 
considered a legal person for the purposes of criminal law. 141 In the context of 
striking down an abortion provision under the Criminal Code, the Supreme 
Court of Canada indicated that a fetus does not have a separate s. 7 right from its 
mother."' Embryos and fetuses do not have legal rights until they are born 
alive."' Canadian common law has also endorsed the born alive rule. In Winni-
peg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G.(D.F.)"' a seven-member 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada invoked the "born alive" rule and re-
fused to restrict the activities of an expectant mother in favour of a societal in-
terest to protect an unborn child. The majority noted "Any right or interest the 
fetus may have remains inchoate and incomplete until the child's birth." 
153  In 
dissent, Sopinka and Major JJ. contended that the born alive rule was a legal 
anachronism - "a common law evidentiary presumption rooted in rudimentary 
medical knowledge that has long since been overtaken by modern science." 114 
The dissenters noted that the state of medical knowledge has since changed to 
undermine the rule. The born alive rule is well established at common law, and 
therefore it is unlikely that gametes and embryos will be considered legal 
"persons." Whether they are property or something in-between however, has yet 
to be determined. 
In private law, such as family, child welfare, and succession law, it seems 
that more emphasis is placed on the best interests of the future child, so long as 
it is born alive. It is a question whether this emphasis on the best interests of the 
child might also apply to the preliminary stages of human development.'55 In the 
context of child welfare and family law, several issues might arise where the 
interests of the fetus conflict with those of the mother's freedom to refuse medi-
cal treatment or to make certain lifestyle choices that place the fetus at risk."' 
For example, the courts have held that a fetus cannot be considered a child for 
purposes of apprehension by child welfare authorities."' The interests of the 
fetus, and therefore, the in utero embryo, are to be determined by the mother. 
148 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
149 See also R. v. Sullivan (1991), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (B.C.C.A). 
'o Borowski v. Canada (AG.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342. 
°' R. v. Morgentaler, [19881 1 S.C.R. 30; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G.(D.F.), [1997] 
3 S.C.R. 925. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G.(D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925, per 
McLachlin J. 
'' Ibid., at 972, per Major J. 
155 See M. Litman & G. Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime Appro-
priate?" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies Overview of Legal Issues in 
New Reproductive Technologies, Research vol. 3 (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 
1993) at 236, 240-42. 
156 See G.(D.F.), supra, note 151; Re "Baby R." (1988), 15 R.F.L. (3d) 225 (B.C.S.C.). 
157 See Re A. (in utero) (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 722 (Ont. U.F.C.). 
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The law in relation to gametes and embryos might yet vary with the extent or 
their perceived "humanness." 
Under succession law, if a pregnant woman's husband provides that his es-
tate be divided equally among all children, and he subsequently dies, the in 
utero child will be deemed to have already come into existence,"' and therefore 
has a right to inherit property. Similarly, intestate succession legislation supports 
inheritance for those conceived at the time of the intestate's death.159 Moreover, 
the common law has provided similar relief in the interests of the child con-
ceived at the time of an accident causing the child's parent(s)' death.'6° 
In the law of negligence, the child may generally claim for injuries wrong-
fully committed while in its mother's womb; the child need not be alive at the 
time of the wrongful act.'6' Canadian tort law requires that the child be subse-
quently born in order for her or him (or someone on her or his behalf) to claim 
negligence."' The common law confers specific rights only upon persons born 
alive, and not embryos or fetuses that fail to exercise their potential for life. 161 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Tremblay v. Daigle,& confirmed this position 
in the context of a man's attempts to prevent a former partner from having an 
abortion. The Court interpreted the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms" to 
mean that a fetus is not a human being; the Quebec government had not shown 
"a clear intention ... to consider the status of a fetus."66 Moreover, due to the 
nature of embryos as forms of potential life, Canadian courts might require clear 
° See art. 838, CCQ (the beneficiary of the will need only be conceived at the time of the testa-
tor's death and afterwards born viable). See also the Wills Act, R.S.M. 1988, c. W-150, s. 25.3 
[en. R.S.M. 1989-90, c. 44, s .5]. See also family relief legislation that also provides similar 
benefits for "dependents" conceived at the time of death; See Intestate Succession Act, R.S.A. 
1980, c. 1-9, s. 10. See also H. Shapo, "Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of 
Reproductive Technologies" (1997) 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 1091; K. Guzman, "Property, Progeny, 
Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth" (1997) 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
193. 
159 Ibid. 
160 For a wide range of examples of legislation and case law, see Litman & Robertson, supra, note 
155 at 237-38. For example, see Fitz.simonds v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada (1984), 29 Alta. L.R. 
(2d) 394 (C.A.) (definition of "dependant" in an automobile insurance policy). For example, 
see Cherry (Guardian) v. Borsman (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 668 (B.C.S.C.); affd (1992), 94 
D.L.R. (4th) 487 (C.A.). 
161 See Duval v. Seguin (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 418 (Ont. H.C.); affd (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 666 
(CA.). In Ontario, the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 66 supersedes this area of the 
common law. 
162 G.(D.F.), supra, note 151. 
163 Litman & Robertson, supra, note 155 at 238. See Borowski v. Canada (AG.), supra, note 150. 
A dilemma, however, might arise in the court's insistence upon hearing concrete cases with live 
issues. The Supreme Court of Canada in Borowski dismissed the appeal as moot - the fetus 
had not survived. 
164 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530. 
165 R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12. 
166 Supra, note 164 at 555. The Court noted the private nature of the case and thus refused to con-
sider the status of the fetus under the Charter. For more detailed discussion, see chapter 9 
"State Intervention in the Lives of Pregnant Women." See also Litman & Robertson, supra, 
note 155 at 238-40. 
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legislative intention to regulate them. Sperm or ova alone, on the other hand, 
cannot exercise any potential for life. 
Gametes and embryos might be considered more like property than persons, 
or vice versa, depending upon the stage of development and the context of the 
owner's assertion of control."' Some commentators argue that the property ap-
proach "may well be able to accommodate competing interests in a more re-
sponsive and responsible manner than the law pertaining to persons  .11161  Yet, the 
property and quasi-property approaches seem inadequate in that they objectify 
human reproductive "materials" and disregard important social and moral di-
mensions such as the sanctity of human life and the power relationships in hu-
man reproduction. Moreover, the concerns over commodification and commer-
cialization would appear to outweigh any arguments in favour of treating gam-
etes and embryos as a form of property - and to be controlled and dominated as 
objects. The use of a property approach, even in the absence of the language of 
"property" and "ownership," does not provide a convincing solution,  161 but 
merely hides the substantive problems discussed above. Moreover, the category 
of property has been much criticized as disregarding such feminist concerns as 
"the objectification of women; the economic exploitation of women; the deni-
gration of human reproduction and the treatment of women as 'baby-making 
machines'; women's alienation from their bodies; the commodification and de-
struction of human values."70  It would, therefore, seem odd to consider gametes 
and embryos strictly as traditional property. Courts in Canada and other com-
mon law jurisdictions have so far shown no indication that gametes and em-
bryos have full status as legal persons.'7' To do otherwise, the courts would 
oppose the reproductive freedom of the parents. It remains to be seen how Ca-
nadian courts might work beyond traditional property conceptions of gametes 
and embryos. 
2. The Personhood Approach 
We have briefly touched upon the personhood approach throughout our de-
scription and critique of the traditional property approach. The personhood ap-
proach basically treats gametes and embryos as full legal persons, with all rights 
and interests that other living persons might enjoy. This approach emphasizes 
one's personal control over unique genetic information as essential to one's per-
sonality and liberty; human beings are considered inviolable and inalienable. 
This approach differs from a property approach in two major respects: (1) it 
does not support commercialization, and, (2) information is considered to be 
167 See Litman & Robertson, ibid., at note 86. 
168 Ibid., at 244. 
169 Ibid., at 267-68. 
'° J. Nedelsky, "Property in Potential Life? A Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories" 
(1993) 6:2 Can. J. L. & Jur. 343. See also N. Wilder, "Society's Response to the New Repro- 
ductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives" (1986) 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1043. 
" See Litman & Robertson, supra, note 155 at 235-42. 
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common to all persons, rather than a "thing" to be appropriated.172  The person-
hood approach however, must contend with the problem that gametes and em-
bryos can be separated from the person(s) who generated them and be implanted 
in third persons. Can these still be viewed as extensions of the person who gen-
erated them, or should these be seen as autonomous persons imbued with the 
full range of the rights of persons? Under a personhdod approach, destruction of 
gametes and embryos would be tantamount to murder, while their commercial 
exploitation may be the equivalent of slavery. 
Quebec civil law considers the control over one's body in light of "rights to 
personality" and individual liberty."' In civil law, a personality rights approach 
seems more accepted for personal control over one's body and its contained 
information. The CCQ holds that every human being has, among others, the 
right to life, personal security, inviolability, and the integrity of the person.'7 
Marie Hirtle notes that the "multiple personality rights found under Quebec civil 
law would ... confer the right to follow, to examine, and to control information 
concerning and originating from a person."7' The basic presupposition is that 
"the human body is dissolubly both person and thing."76 This bespeaks the in-
between approach, where gametes and embryos are treated as somewhere be-
tween property and persons, depending on the specific context. This is the sui 
generis approach discussed below. 
3. Sui Generis and Other Approaches 
Rather than treat gametes and embryos as one of the two extremes as objects 
(property) or as subjects (persons) the courts may consider some type of sui 
generis or relational approach on a case-by-case basis."' It has been said that 
"the emerging trend is to characterize the legal status of the embryos ex utero 
and gametes as sui generis.""' Sui generis means "its own type" or "class by 
itself." In other words, such an approach denies any analogy between this class 
of objects and any other type of relationship or entity. In using this approach, 
the focus remains on the factual setting and "particularly, on the relationship 
172 M. Hirtle, "Civil Law and the Status of Human Genetic Material," in B. Knoppers, T. Caulfield 
& T.D. Kinsella, eds., Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material (Toronto: Edmond Mont- 
gomery, 1996) at 104. 
171 Ibid., at 85. 
" See also R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
175 Supra, note 172 at 108. 
176 Ibid., at 116. 
'' The sui generis approach, however, cannot be "policy neutral"; the policy choices merely em-
body the subjective views of one judge, participant or another. However, for an opposite opin-
ion, see M. Litman & G. Robertson, "Reproductive Technology: Is a Property Law Regime 
Appropriate?" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies Overview of Legal Is-
sues in New Reproductive Technologies Research vol. 3 (Minister of Supply and Services Can-
ada, 1993) at 268. 
178 
M. Litman & G. Robertson, "The Common Law Status of Genetic Material," in B. Knoppers, 
T. Caulfield & T.D. Kinsella, eds, Legal Rights and Human Genetic Material (Toronto: Ed-
mond Montgomery 1996) at 55. 
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between the parties, and not the genetic material itself. ""'A sui generis ap-
proach, whether considered under the concept of property or personhood, sup-
ports a more flexible consideration of relations among persons and things. It 
also emphasizes the application of policy interests on a case-by-case basis. On 
the other hand, while a sui generis approach might escape the traditional con-
straints of a property approach, it does so only to rely upon the discretion of 
courts. 
This approach may be criticized as simply begging the question to what class 
do gametes and embryos belong? In order to fill the legal void and arrive at a 
reasoned outcome, the courts may determine that these materials or relationships 
are "like" persons or property, thereby falling back on familiar statuses or rela-
tionships in an effort to arrive at a more certain legal outcome. The sui generis 
approach may ultimately become self-defeating and result in a body of inconsis-
tent analogies applied in different cases. 
A possible way out of this dilemma may be offered by the relational ap-
proach, which acknowledges that these materials differ from existing categories 
but recognizes the intrinsic interests which are generated by the manner in 
which these materials emerge and the purposes to which they are applied. The 
relational (or relationship) approach provides an alternative to that of traditional 
property, personhood, and sui generis. The relational approach focuses on rela-
tionships and the conditions that foster capacity to form relationships."' Rather 
than focussing on individualistic conceptions, such as rights, the relational ap-
proach acknowledges relationships among individuals and communities, for 
example, those of power, responsibility, trust, obligation, respect, and caretak-
ing."' In doing so, the law might sensitively adapt to changing societal values 
and advances in RTs, and perhaps better address issues of "control, decision-
making authority, and responsibility" for potential human life. 
Although the relational approach provides a critical alternative to the tradi-
tional property and personhood approaches, choices and decisions must yet be 
made about the status and disposition of gametes and embryos, and the relation-
ships among the women and men who contribute genetically or non-genetically 
to human reproduction. The choices and decisions resulting from the resolution 
of legal disputes in practice, will create hierarchies of relationships deemed 
worthy of legal recognition and status. A relational approach, however, may 
appear useful in allowing courts to better recognize relationships of power and 
control over the lives of genetic contributors and gestational providers, espe- 
cially those women who bear additional responsibilities,"' as well as in recog-
nizing gametes and embryos as potential human life. As the Royal Commission 
states, it is "essential to ensure that zygotes (and presumably, gametes) are 
'v" Ibid., at 55. 
180 Nedelsky, supra, note 170. See also R. Rao, "Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Repro- 
ductive Technology" (1998) 45 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1077. 
'' Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
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treated with respect because of their connections to the human community."83 
Having discussed various conceptual frameworks for the status and control of 
gametes and embryos, we now analyze specific legal issues related to the con-
trol and use of gametes and embryos. 
[IIDxIvtS] 111f111) I D(VI 1 Di iM'&I}:1 
1. Gamete and Embryo Donation 
A woman may wish to reproduce using the sperm or ova of known or anony-
mous donors in a number of circumstances including: the absence of a male 
partner, the existence of male factor infertility in her partner, or the desire to 
avoid the transferring of infectious diseases or genetic conditions to offspring. 
Ovum and embryo donation can be used in cases of female factor infertility, or 
for example, where two women choose to share the genetic and gestational as-
pects of pregnancy. In some cases sperm and ovum may be treated or otherwise 
manipulated to facilitate fertilization. We now consider the regulation of gamete 
and embryo donation in Canada, highlighting differences encountered in their 
regulation. The analysis will illustrate a range of solutions depending upon the 
choice of conceptual framework to be applied to gametes and embryos: whether 
they are treated as property, persons, or something in between (sui generis). 
(a) Gametes 
In Canada and elsewhere, the special nature of human tissues, and specifically, 
gametes (sperm and ova), has resulted in attempts to regulate their transfer. In 
Canada, the federal government now regulates the processing and distribution of 
semen for assisted conception.'tm This legislation uses the language of "donor" to 
address the distribution of sperm and ova. The province of Quebec regulates the 
donation of both sperm and ova, and deems the gestational mother to be the 
legal mother for legal purposes.185 As well, in most provinces, legislation exists 
to control the transfer of human tissues for organ transplantation. "'As we have 
discussed previously, one might argue that human tissue legislation includes the 
donation of gametes and embryos. These particular human tissues however, are 
unique in their potential to create life and are not "replaceable by natural proc-
esses of repair." In varying degrees, sperm, ova and embryos deserve special 
183 Royal Commission, Proceed With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Repro-
ductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992) at 17. 
184 Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, SOR/96-254 under 
the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. 
185 CCQ 1991, c. 64, art. 19, 538-42. 
156 For example, see Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 20, s. 1; Human Tissue Gift Act, 
R.S.A. 1980, c. H-12, s. 1(b); Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211, s. 1. But see also 
CCQ 1991, c. 64, art. 19, which States that a person may "... alienate a part of his [sic] body 
only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no serious risk to his [sic] health 
results." Article 20 of the CCQ requires that "[t]he alienation must be gratuitous unless its ob-
ject is a part of the body susceptible to regeneration." 
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consideration as human tissue necessary for reproduction. Although human tis-
sue legislation might or might not apply to gametes and embryos, Canadian 
courts may find it useful to draw parallels to the statutory provisions of such 
legislation. 
The transfer of human tissue is generally considered as a gift, not a sale. Sec-
tion 10 of the Ontario Human Tissue Gift Act"' states, "[n]o person shall buy, 
sell or otherwise deal in, directly or indirectly, for a valuable consideration, any 
tissue for a transplant, or any body or part or parts thereof other than blood or a 
blood constituent, for therapeutic purposes, medical education or scientific re-
search, and any such dealing is invalid as being contrary to public policy.""' 
Similarly, art. 25 of the CCQ states, "[t]he alienation by a person of a part or 
product of his body shall be gratuitous; it may not be repeated if it involves a 
risk to his health." 
Several provincial statutes regulate who may donate human tissues generally, 
and gametes specifically. Article 538 of the CCQ provides that a person may 
donate gametes for "[p]articipation in the parental project of another person by 
way of a contribution of genetic material." Section 3(1) of the Ontario Human 
Tissue Gift Act states that a person may consent to an inter vivos gift for trans-
plant, if she or he is at least 16 years old, mentally competent, and able to make 
a free and informed decision. Section 4(1) of the Human Tissue Gift Act pro-
vides that a person, if she or he is at least 16 years old, may consent to a post 
mortem gift, "in writing signed by the person at any time; or orally in the pres-
ence of a least two witnesses during the person's last illness." The gift can be 
made "for therapeutic purposes, medical education or scientific research." 
The common law also tends to distinguish between the various forms of a 
gift inter vivos and a gift causa mortis. Gamete donation may occur during the 
donor's lifetime, or after her or his death. These two scenarios have traditionally 
created different responses under the law of property. The transfer of reproduc-
tive "materials" and the use of RTs, however, require a more complex approach 
to legal analysis than traditionally applied under the law of property. 
Gametes from a donor who has since died may be used for reproduction. Per-
sons can now store their gametes in sperm or ova banks, for subsequent dona-
tion after death. It seems that courts will recognize the special nature of gam-
etes, and requirements and conditions for the exchange of human tissue, espe-
cially in the case where contributors have since died."' As a matter of public 
policy, however, some argue the gametes of deceased donors should not be used 
for reproduction because of the possible effects on children born without live 
genetic parents. Ethical issues also arise when gametes are retrieved from do-
nors who are deceased persons or fetuses. For example, a woman might wish to 
187 Ibid. It is unclear whether or not gametes will fall under human tissue legislation. 
188 Similar provisions can also be found in Human Tissue Gift Act, supra, note 185, s.10; Human 
Tissue GiftAct, supra, note 185, ss.10, 11. 
189 M. Martin et al., "The Limits of Freedom of Contract: The Commercialization of Reproductive 
Materials and Services," in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies Overview 
of Legal Issues in New Reproductive Technologies Research vol. 3 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply 
and Services Canada, 1993) at 401. 
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use sperm from a dead male partner,"' or a man might wish to use ova from a 
dead female partner to be fertilized by in vitro fertilization and implanted in a 
gestational mother)9' 
Under Ontario's Human Tissue Gift Act,"' where the deceased person has not 
given consent and dies, or cannot give consent by reason of injury or disease, 
and the person's death is imminent, s. 5(2) provides a lengthy hierarchal list of 
persons, beginning with spouses, children and relatives, who may, on behalf of 
that person, consent to transplantation. Section 5(2)(/) provides that where no 
spouse or relatives can be found, transplantation may be authorized by the "the 
person lawfully in possession of the body other than, where the person died in 
hospital, the administrative head of the hospital." Under s. 5(3), consent cannot 
be given if there is reason to believe that the deceased person would have ob-
jected. If ova and sperm fall under the Human Tissue Gift Act, post mortem re-
production may be considered legal in Ontario. However, this might be consid-
ered morally unacceptable where retrieval of sperm and ova requires an invasive 
procedure on a "brain dead" person, in contrast to retrieval from existing sup-
plies in storage banks. Further issues arise as to whether or not the deceased 
should be considered the legal father or mother for purposes of birth registration 
or inheritance. In these cases, and in the absence of specific legislation, Cana-
dian courts may draw analogies to organ transplantation under the Human Tis-
sue Gift Act and the law of adoption. 
For post mortem reproduction, the main issue is whether the deceased in-
tended to have children after death. Although Canadian courts have not ad-
dressed this, courts in other jurisdictions have. In Parpalaix v. CECOS,' 93 the 
French Tribunaux de grande instance discussed the dispositional control over 
the donor's sperm deposit, and the issue of whether the donor intended to have 
children during his lifetime or after death. The Tribunaux held in favour of the 
deceased donor's wishes to have children after death. In Hecht v. Superior Court 
of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (Kane),' 94 the California 
Court of Appeal recognized the deceased donor's expressed intentions. In 
Hecht, the court held that the donor had an ownership interest under at least an 
"interim category," if not personal property law. In the case of R. v. Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood,"' the English Court of 
190 
R. v. Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority ex parte Blood, [1996] 3 W.L.R. 1177 
(Q.B.D.); R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] 2 All 
E.R. 687 (CA.). 
These scenarios are not so unusual given medical advances in physically maintaining "legally 
dead" (or "brain dead") persons. 
192 Supra, note 185. 
T.G.I. Creteil, August 1, 1984, Gazette do Palais, September 15, 1984 (France), as discussed in 
E.D. Shapiro & B. Sonnenblick, "The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-mortem Insemi-
nation," 1 J.L. & Health 229 (1986/87), as cited in Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 CaLRptr. 2d 
275, 288 (Ct. App. 1993). See also D.J. Jones, "Artifical Procreation, Societal Reconceptions: 
Legal Insight From France" (1988) 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 525. 
"° 
Hecht v. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (Kane), 20 
Cal.Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
195 R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, supra, note 190. 
Appeal considered a woman's attempts to use the sperm she obtained from her 
comatose husband. The husband died shortly afterwards. The Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Act 1990,196  clearly required expressed written consent of 
a donor for the taking and use of his sperm, including for posthumous repro-
duction. No written consent existed in this case.'97 
The commercialization of human reproduction raises obvious concerns, de-
spite the law's insistence that the transfer of gametes be treated as gifts only. 
Although Bill C-47 does not explicitly address the issue, it does provide some 
indirect constraints subject to interpretation. Section 6(1) would prohibit the 
sale, purchase, barter or exchange of sperm, ova, or embryos, or an offer to do 
so. Section 6(2), however, provides an exception to s. 6(1) for "the reimburse-
ment of expenses incurred in the collection, storage or distribution of ova or 
sperm, except any such expenses incurred by their donor." Although compensa-
tion for gamete donation is usually limited to reasonable expenses, the definition 
of "expenses" is a matter for interpretation. 
Moreover, there has been much concern over the exploitation of women who 
exchange "spare" eggs (or ova) to be implanted in other women in return for 
compensation or reduced fees for in vitro fertilization or other medical serv-
ices."' In some medical practices, women patients are asked for the "designated 
donation" of ova in exchange for services or reduced rates. The Royal Commis-
sion would prohibit physicians from revoking services when a woman chooses 
not to donate spare ova. Moreover, a free market approach towards human re-
production has been criticized for devaluing and degrading gametes. It treats 
gametes as property and their producers as reproductive means. To address such 
concerns, the regulation of sperm and ova donation should maintain some 
flexibility for changing social norms. 
Rather than suggesting an absolute ban on such exchanges, several commen-
tators emphasized the importance of women's informed consent to embryo do-
nation in these circumstances. It is suggested that informed consent might ame-
liorate the power imbalances and exploitation that women may face due to so-
cio-economic disparities. Others contend that truly informed consent is not pos-
sible in light of an already existing state of gender inequities. We have previ-
ously discussed the issue of informed consent. However, it is noteworthy to 
mention that Canadian courts have not yet faced the issue of revocation of con-
sent by a gamete donor. One might argue that the option to revoke consent prior 
to actual implantation of gametes into recipients would empower women by 
making available choices in some circumstances. 
196 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37(5) (Eng.). 
197 Ms. Blood did however, succeed in receiving the tight to use her husband's sperm for artificial 
insemination. Pursuant Ao another section of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 
1990, the sperm could be exported abroad and Ms. Blood inseminated in a European Commu-
nity state (ibid.). 
198 P. Cheney, "Human egg trade lures elite students," The Globe and Mail (9 July 1998) Al. 
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(b) Embryos 
Embryo donation raises different issues than those for gametes per se. Given 
their potential for human life, embryos, like fetuses, deserve special attention 
under existing law or a future regulatory regime. In addition, embryos involve 
two genetic contributors, each with a potential interest in the embryo. The 
common law may distinguish between in utero and ex utero embryos. The latter 
are located in a storage bank while the former are located in the womb of a ges-
tational mother. Canadian courts, especially in the context of abortion, have 
acknowledged that women have full autonomy to make decisions over their 
bodies and to abort embryos or fetuses they may be carrying.'99 
The legal issues of control and parenthood, however, become more compli-
cated in the context of RTs where the gestational mother differs from the genetic 
mother. The courts have yet to face the difficult issue of revocation of consent 
for the donation fh[ to it gestational mother Cana 
dfaifö&irts, however, would mothern the control 
and disposition of an embryo that has already been implanted. 
Embryo donation requires the informed consent of both genetic donors, if 
known. Consent should be clearly expressed, specific, and in writing. For em-
bryo donation particularly, an agreement might cover disposition for such con-
tingencies as the death of one or both donors. As well, an agreement could ex-
pressly address dispositional issues upon the revocation of consent by one or 
both donors. However, it is uncertain whether Canadian courts would enforce 
such an agreement given the special, unique nature of embryo donation. The 
issues also raise the arguments familiar in the debate over abortion: the pro-life 
versus pro-choice schools of thought. The courts, however, will likely empha-
size the special nature of embryos as potential life forms and the autonomy of 
gestational mothers in making decisions that directly affect their lives. 
A woman who separates from a male partner" may seek custody of cryopre-
served embryos in which she and her partner genetically contributed. The 
woman may wish to keep the embryos for herself for subsequent implantation. 
Or, she may wish to transfer the embryos (or dispositional authority) to a third 
party, for example, another woman or couple, or to simply destroy the embryos. 
If the male contributor is opposed to such a transfer or destruction, and if Cana- 
dian courts support joint control, then the woman would have no legal recourse. 
The common law abroad has thus far supported joint control over embryo dis-
position where neither contributor is an anonymous donor. In the case of cryo- 
preserved (or frozen) embryos, if the parties cannot mutually agree, then by 
court order or pre-conception contract, the embryo bank (where the embryos are 
stored in cryopreservation) may allow the embryo to perish.20' In Davis v. 
199 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
200 
The novelty of reproductive technologies have not yet provided much opportunity for the law 
to consider same sex couples. See Korn v. Potter (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 437 (B.C.S.C.). 
201 
See A. Eser, "The Legal Status of the Embryo in Comparative Perspective" (1992) 11 Medicine 
and Law 579. 
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Davis,200  as we previously discussed, the court directly confronted the issue of 
whether one genetic contributor, Ms. Davis, could transfer the cryopreserved 
pre-embryos to another woman, despite Mr. Davis' wishes not to proceed. In the 
end, the court in Davis recognized that each contributor has an equal say in the 
disposition of the frozen ex utero pre-embryos. Mr. Davis' right not to repro-
duce trumped Ms. Davis' right to transfer the embryos to another woman. The 
emphasis on joint control, however, does not seem to adequately address gen-
der-based imbalances in power and control over human reproduction. In making 
decisions over control and disposition, the courts should consider the fact that 
women undergo an invasive procedure to remove some of their limited supply 
of ova for donation. In such cases, the courts should proceed cautiously and 
with careful review of power imbalances and policy interests, in the absence of 
clear legislation. 
A different scenario arises where both the woman and man initially aban-
doned the cryopreserved embryos but later found that the embryo bank sought 
to donate them for implantation into other women. This situation, given the em-
bryo's development and potential for human life, may warrant a higher standard 
of consent by both genetic contributors for the specific purposes of the embryo 
implantation, as well as a specific threshold for abandonment. 
Genetic parents, like those in Davis, can vary or revoke their consent for em-
bryo donation. One or both genetic contributors might revoke consent for em-
bryo donation, despite prior agreement to the contrary. In the case of one 
anonymous contributor, embryo donation may follow the same rules and prin-
ciples applicable to gamete donation. Moreover, the intended gestational mother 
might revoke her consent to be the recipient. The disposition of embryos could 
become problematic when one or both of the genetic contributors die. The 
Royal Commission recommends that embryos not be stored beyond the death of 
one or both of the genetic contributors.203 Again, it remains to be seen how Ca-
nadian courts might decide these latter issues. As we discussed previously, s. 5 
of the Human Tissue Gift Act provides for the post mortem transfer of disposi-
tional authority to non-family members, provided that there is no reason "to 
believe that the deceased person would have objected."200 
202 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
203 Royal Commission, supra, note 183 at 599. 
204 The first publicized case to raise issues about the status and disposition of frozen embryos 
created through in vitro fertilization involved Mr. and Mrs. Rios, a wealthy California couple 
who received in vitro fertilization in Australia. Two embryos were frozen when Mr. and Mrs. 
Rios died in an airplane crash. Apparently the Rioses left no written instructions regarding the 
fate of the "orphan embryos" and a lengthy and heated debate arose about whether the embryos 
should be destroyed, made available for anonymous donation, or deliberately gestated in order 
to permit them to inherit an intestate share of the Rioses' estate. For further discussion of this 
case and the issues it raises see: George P. Smith II., "Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Embryos: A 
Medical, Legal and Ethical Dilemma" (1985-86) 24 J. F. L. 27. 
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The use of donor gametes raises issues of identification and anonymity. Some 
women may choose to bear a child using the sperm or ova of anonymous do-
nors. An infertile couple may wish to combine anonymous donations of sperm 
and ova, with hopes of implanting the embryo into the woman partner as gesta-
tional mother. The availability of sperm and ova will depend upon the supply of 
and access to anonymous donor contributions, usually through sperm and ova 
banks. Embryos however, are rarely made available for donation. 
The requirement of informed consent also applies to anonymous donors. The 
donor must be informed of the specific purpose of the donation and the potential 
benefits and risks. Anonymous donors, if they provide informed consent, gen-
erally waive their beneficial interests and right to control gametes and embryos, 
as well as future child support obligations and custody rights. Thus, donors re-
ceive anonymity in exchange for their own relinquishment of dispositional con-
trol and the guarantee that no legal claims will be found against them. Canadian 
courts, moreover, tend not to hold anonymous donors liable for the quality and 
fitness of the product.205  This position supports the policy interest of making 
available a large pool of sperm and ova for donation. 
A more controversial issue arises if the donor wishes to remain anonymous, 
whereas the child seeks access to information that identifies her or his genetic 
parents. At some point the child's interest in obtaining social, cultural and medi-
cal information for her or his psychological or social well-being could override 
the policy interest to ensure a large supply of donor sperms and eggs. One pos-
sible resolution would centre on the child's access to non-identifying genetic 
information. This would, however, still lead to issues about the nature and ex-
tent of such information and its restricted availability. In serious medical cases 
where the child's health or life is at risk, key genetic information should be 
made available. 
A registry is one possible solution to ensure limits to the number of offspring 
by donors and to guarantee that children genetically-related do not unknowingly 
reproduce. It might also be helpful for children to receive counselling prior to 
receiving registry information about their genetic parents. The existence of a 
donation registry, however, may lead to misuses or abuses of information by 
governments and private parties. In order to resolve these issues, Canadian 
courts will likely draw parallels to the statutory and common law respecting 
adoption. 
Genetic and gestational parents, if they differ, may also have a legal obli-
gation to tell their children about non-genetic links to donors. There seems to 
be a strong societal interest in children knowing the "genetic truth." If such 
obligations exist, and in the absence of relevant legislation, the courts will 
likely consider an appropriate age for the disclosure of the fact of donation 
and for the provision of specific information about the donor. In the absence 
205 ter Neuzen V. Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674. 
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of such disclosure, children might suffer from "genetic bewilderment" and 
social stigmatization .21 
Children may also attempt to claim support payments or inheritance from an 
identified donor. The issue remains whether common law courts will refuse to 
provide children with legal interests against donors or their estates. In deciding 
such legal issues, Canadian courts would likely consider the "best interests of 
the child" principle, and the policy interest in the availability of anonymous 
donation. Where the child wishes however, the donor might revoke his or her 
anonymity arrangement. 
3. Freezing and Disposal of Gametes and Embryos 
The freezing (or cryopreservation) of tissues provides new opportunities for the 
testing and screening of ex utero sperm, ova, and embryos for donation. 
Donated sperm, ova, and embryos may now be screened for HIV, other sexually 
transmitted diseases, and various genetic factors. Moreover, a physician's duty 
of care as a medical professional now requires reasonable efforts to test and 
screen donation, whether known or anonymous.207  This duty has now been 
specifically detailed and embodied in a federal statute dealing with the process-
ing and distribution of semen,208 
In light of the sensitivity of the subject matter - potential forms of human 
life and uniquely identifying information - governments may impose limits on 
the condition and quantity of gametes and embryos stored and transferred be-
tween individuals and institutions. In Canada, for example, the federal govern-
ment now regulates the processing and distribution of semen for assisted con-
ception.209  Moreover, at common law, storage facilities might have a duty of 
care to screen and test frozen gametes and embryos for illnesses and genetic 
conditions."' One might argue, however, that governmental regulation of the 
storage and handling facilities for gametes and embryos may lead to increased 
use of unlicensed artificial insemination and higher risks due to the absence of 
donor screening for illnesses and genetic disease.211  In other words, a regulatory 
regime that too strictly controls the storage and transfer of gametes and embryos 
could lead to an underground market for reproductive services and "materials." 
The few common law cases so far decided, indicate the importance of the 
donor parties' intentions prior to the freezing and storage of gametes and em-
bryos.212  The parties should also express their intentions with respect to such 
206 R. Achilles, "The Social Meanings of Donor Insemination" The Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, vol. 9 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993). 
207 See ter Neuzen v. Korn, supra, note 205. 
205 Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, S0R196-254, under 
the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. 
209 Ibid.  
210 See ter Neuzen v. Korn, supra, note 205. 
211 However, see the regulations of the Food and Drugs Act, supra, note 208, which became en-
forceable June 1, 1996 (the federal government controls the processing, testing and distribution 
of semen for donor insemination). 
212 Davis v. Davis, supra, note 202. 
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dispositional contingencies as the donors' death or abandonment of donation. As 
previously discussed, human tissue gift legislation might apply to gametes and 
embryos once frozen and stored, assuming they fall under the Act. If so, ss 
5(2)(f) and (3) of Ontario's Human Tissue Gift Act213  suggest that storage banks 
might have a dispositional authority (over "transplantation") based on posses-
sion, if no other family member or relative can be found, and there is no reason 
to believe that the deceased person would have objected. 
The abandonment of sperm, ova or embryo donations creates new issues of 
control and disposition. Storage facilities may assert control over abandoned 
gametes and embryos on the sole basis of possession. Also, those parties who 
assisted in the abstraction of such reproductive materials and products might 
attempt to gain dispositional control over them. The situation may also be simi-
lar where the donors of gametes and embryos die, without any expressed inten-
tions and specific instructions for donation. The freezing of sperm and ova can 
therefore lead to complex issues of dispositional authority. Moreover, the dis-
posal of gametes and embryos should occur by means which account for their 
status as potential (or early) forms of human life. 
The commercialization of freezing processes and storage facilities for gam-
etes and embryos raises serious concerns. The Final Report of the Royal Com-
mission recommended: 
No profit should be made from the selling of any reproductive material, including 
sperm, because of ultimately dc-humanizing effects. Current commercial practices 
in storage and distribution of donor sperm contravene these values, and we rec-
ommend a licensed, non profit system .214 
The Royal Commission warns against the commercialization of human repro-
duction and the commodification of gametes and embryos. Moreover, Bill C-47 
would call for the licensing of such facilities and allow for the "reimbursement 
of expenses incurred in the collection, storage or distribution of ova or sperm, 
except any such expenses incurred by their donor.  1121' The maximum storage 
period for frozen embryos has been variously debated. The Royal Commission 
suggested that it would be unethical to store beyond five years or after the death 
of either partner .211 One might also argue that time limits be applied to the stor-
age of sperm and ova. Moreover, the personnel for such storage banks should be 
qualified in the handling, processing and distributing of such sensitive 
"materials." The personnel also might be subject to government regulation. To 
ensure that qualified personnel are employed and that facilities are properly 
maintained and managed may require government licensing and regulation. 
213 R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 20. 
214 
Royal Commission, Proceed With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Repro-
ductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992), at 15. 
215 Bill C-47, Human Reproduction and Genetic Technologies Act, 2nd Sess., 35th Par]. 1996. 
216 Royal Commisssion, supra, note 214 at 599. 
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Ovarian stimulation and ovum retrieval usually lead to the generation of a num-
ber of embryos, one or some of which are selected and implanted into a woman. 
It has been generally recognized that the treatment of "spare" embryos is an 
important matter of human dignity and integrity."' As previously discussed, 
embryos, as potential human life, have moral status somewhere in between 
property and full personhood, and should be treated with respect. In light of the 
moral status of embryos and the potential risks to society, research on them may 
be totally prohibited, or at least, carefully regulated and monitored. Some have 
argued that ova should not be fertilized for the sole purposes of embryo re-
search, except in unusual circumstances as determined by a regulatory body 
where knowledge cannot be attained by other means, and where such research 
would benefit society as well as future children."' Others have argued that the 
fertilization of ova for research should be widely permitted in that it could ad-
vance scientific knowledge and benefit society.219 
The commercialization of embryo research has also been generally recog-
nized as immoral. The selling and buying of sperm, ova, and embryos has 
been widely condemned in Canada and abroad. Proposed federal legislation, 
Bill C-47, would impose criminal sanctions for the sale, purchase, barter or 
exchange of gametes and embryos, whether for research or other purposes.22° It 
is acknowledged, however, that some expenses or compensation for losses in- 
curred would be necessary to ensure minimum supplies for embryo research, if 
allowed. Article 25 of the CCQ states that "[aln experiment may not give rise to 
any financial reward other than the payment of an indemnity as compensation 
for the loss and inconvenience suffered." Some commentators support the al-
lowance of "out-of-pocket" expenses and non-profit costs for storage, handling, 
transportation and transfer .221 
Bill C-47, by contrast, would allow for the "reimbursement of expenses in-
curred in the collection, storage or distribution of ova or sperm, except any such 
expenses incurred by their donor .11211 Existing and proposed statutory law for 
gamete and embryo donation, however, rather vaguely define such terms as ex-
penses, compensation, or losses. 
A primary issue of public concern is the age limit of embryos subject to re-
search, in light of the initial development of nervous systems and possible hu-
man suffering. It has been recommended that any research be limited to em- 
217 See I. Kennedy, "The Moral Status of the Embryo," in I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in 
Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 119. 
218 Final Report of the Discussion Group on Embryo Research: "Research on Human Embryos in 
Canada" (submitted to Health Canada, 15 November 1995) recommendation 10 [hereinafter 
"Final Report of the Discussion Group on Embryo Research"]. 
219 Royal Commission, supra, note 214 at 608-09. 
220 Supra, note 215, s. 6(1). 
221 Final Report of the Discussion Group on Embryo Research, supra, note 218, recommendation 
16. 
222 Supra, note 215, s. 6(2). 
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bryos not older than 14 days from conception - which is also the stage at 
which implantation no longer becomes medically viable .221 
As discussed previously in section IV.A "Informed Consent" of this chapter, 
donors must provide informed consent specific to the purposes of research on 
gametes and embryos. Consent for embryo donation for research purposes 
should be clearly expressed and in written form  .114  Informed consent may re-
quire that donors be aware of specific research uses, as well as a range of op-
tions, including gestational use, donation to other women, or disposal  .221  It has 
been recommended that "a very high level of disclosure" be required, including 
success rates and the range of possible negative outcomes where known .221 
Various concerns have also been raised over women and men being unaware 
subjects of experimentation. In cases of re-implantation of an embryo in a 
woman's body, informed consent requires her awareness of the "experimental, 
innovative or unproven" nature of techniques, such as pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis  .121  Medical scientists, on the other hand, often argue that such strict 
standards for consent "chill" research that could otherwise benefit society. It 
seems that Canadian society, through dialogue and debate, may consider the 
effects on embryo research specifically, and biotechnology generally, in light of 
their social implications. 
Some provincial statutes expressly regulate the use of such materials for re-
search. For example, art. 22 of the CCQ stipulates that "a part of the body, 
whether an organ, tissue or other substance, removed from a person as part of 
the care he receives may, with his consent or that of the person qualified to give 
consent for him, be used for purposes of research." Under s. 4(1) of the Ontario 
Human Tissue Gift Act,227a  a person may consent to have her or his body or body 
parts removed and used for "medical education or scientific research." Accord-
ing to ss. 5(2) and (3), where the deceased person has not given consent and 
dies, or cannot give consent by reason of injury or disease, and the person's 
death is imminent, the Human Tissue Gift Act allocates dispositional authority 
according to a hierarchal list of family members, relatives, or other authorities in 
possession of the body. There must, however, exist no reason to believe that the 
deceased person would have objected. In the case of embryos, proposed s. 7(3) 
of Bill C-47 would require consent by the "producers" of embryos for the spe-
cific purpose of research. 
223 
Final Report of the Discussion Group on Embryo Research, supra, note 218, recommendation 
3. 
224 
See generally, B. Dickens, "Reproduction Law and Medical Consent," (1985) U.T.L.J. 255. 
225 
Final Report of the Discussion Group on Embryo Research, supra, note 218, recommendations 
6 & 7. 
226 Ibid., at 17-18. 
227 Ibid. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis involves the use of in vitro fertilization and the testing 
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of embryos for genetic abnormality prior to implantation in a woman's body. 
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Reproductive technologies raise a myriad of legal, ethical and social issues with 
which society must contend. These include questions about who should have 
access to their use, how to control the disposition of excess embryos and 
whether women should be inseminated with the sperm of men who are now 
deceased. Finding answers to these issues is difficult, in part, because there is no 
social consensus concerning which acts and practices should be permissible. As 
we have suggested in this chapter, while some of the legal questions generated 
by reproductive technologies might be adequately resolved by applying existing 
common law principles and statutes to them, there is a widely held sentiment, 
that a direct legislative response is needed. Legislative intervention would en-
sure respect for the fundamental values of Canadian society, protect the public 
against risks to health and safety, and provide clear principles of law according 
to which potential disputes could be resolved. 
The design of a legislative response to reproductive technologies in Canada 
remains a difficult enterprise. We need to assess the effectiveness of different 
types of law to answer problems raised by RTs. For example, the use of criminal 
prohibitions rather than more flexible regulatory regimes need to be considered. 
In addition, there may be a danger in assuming that new laws enacted by Par-
liament or legislatures can adequately address all of the problems raised by RTs. 
It has been argued that the challenge posed by RTs "is to harness the law so as 
to mediate between moral imperatives and the therapeutic or non-therapeutic 
benefits of the advancement of science.""' How can we fashion a regulatory 
regime "which incorporates a review of the ethical and social consequences of 
the technology""' in addition to ensuring its safety and efficacy? The fact of 
Canadian federalism further complicates the possibility of a national and uni-
form approach to the regulation of reproductive technologies. On the other 
hand, in the absence of a legislated regulatory framework, the development of 
case law may be more susceptible to differing interpretations and policy prefer-
ences in the different jurisdictions under Canadian federalism. Here, the tradi-
tional role of the federal government in regulating medical technology overlaps 
with the exclusive provincial role in the provision of medical services. 
The commodification of gametes and embryos and the commercialization of 
human reproduction raise pressing concerns that cannot be left to market forces 
and an order of private law. Any regulatory regime must flexibly account for the 
social and biological dimensions of reproductive technologies, in light of the 
Canadian Constitution and evolving societal norms. At the same time, medical 
research and technological developments ought not be overly constrained or 
"chilled" because of regulation. Canadians will likely be affected by develop- 
228 P. Healy, "The Criminalization of New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies" in L. Weir, 
ed., Governing Medically Assisted Human Reproduction: Report of an Intenational Symposium 
(Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1997) 73 at 70. 
229 M. Hudson, "Societal Controls on New Reproductive Technologies: A Canadian Perspective" 
in L. Weir, ed., Governing Medically Assisted Human Reproduction: Report of an International 
Symposium (Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre of Criminology, 1997) at 77. 
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ments outside Canada's borders. Conflicting and inconsistent precedents both 
from Canadian and other common law jurisdictions are likely to leave a de facto  
situation of market regulation with private ordering as the default. Moreover, 
given the central role played by medical practitioners in offering and providing 
reproductive technologies, any form of piecemeal private ordering is likely to 
leave in place the medical model as the dominant model of decision-making. 
Once private ordering and market forces become entrenched it may be very dif-
ficult to put in place an alternative statutory regime and a distinctive form of 
administrative regulation. 
The Royal Commission and other commissions and panels have raised con-
cerns over reproductive technologies before the public. If reproductive tech-
nologies are a response to infertility, it should be recognized that infertility is as 
much a social condition as a medical problem. Bill C-47, which died on the or-
der paper, provides an initial basis from which legislators might attempt to co-
ordinate a comprehensive regulatory regime that respects the profound social 
consequences of reproductive technologies. Any such regime should carefully 
account for the responsible gatekeeping of new forms of family and the effects 
on personal and social lives. It remains to be seen whether a distinctive Cana-
dian regulatory regime will be fashioned in this area. 
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The Human Genome Project is a massive scientific endeavor designed to se-
quence and eventually map the human genetic code. Once this mapping of the 
"genetic landscape" is complete, scientists will then concentrate on identifying 
the actual biological function of each gene. This will facilitate a revolution in 
medical diagnostics, screening, and therapies for genetic disorders.' 
While the possible benefits of the project are immense, the sensitive nature of 
the data has potential for significant harms (whether unintentional or inten-
tional). Indeed, concern for the proper use of genetic information has raised 
several key policy dilemmas. For example: what are the implications for auton-
omy and privacy?; what is the legal status of human genetic material i.e., is it 
property or person?; what are the social and legal implications of DNA forensic 
identification testing in criminal and family law cases?; is there a risk that insur-
ance companies will inappropriately use genetic information for risk assess-
ment?; and does genetic information have the potential to be used to justify dis-
criminatory practices in employment settings? 
This chapter seeks to review these and other issues. Through the review it 
will illustrate not only the different areas of law affected by the new human ge-




Proteins are the building blocks of the human body. They are present in many 
forms throughout the human body and they can be found as enzymes, haemo- 
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